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Essentials of Freedom Theory*

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I

Prospects for freedom are uncertain as we approach the end of this century. Indeed, so are the prospects for continuing human life on this planet.

All sane individuals probably agree that contemporary political theory faces no challenge more urgent than that of seeking to safeguard the continuance of human life on this planet. If so, we must also agree that radical inquiry is required, in the sense that easy assumptions of conventional wisdom must no longer be allowed to stand in the way of critical inquiry. With literally everything at stake for all of us, insofar as we feel a concern for the future of man, it would hardly be rational to let our inquiry, our questions asked or answers found, be diverted or muted by sacred cows, or by the fear of offending respectable or powerful people.

Of all the myths that serve to pacify and depoliticize citizens in our modern world, including political theorists, I believe none has been more effective than the illusion of democratic government: the assertion that we all have equal political rights, and that, consequently, the ultimate power in our society rests with the majority. It is on this basis, in large part, that so many citizens have come to regard our laws and government policies as universally entitled, not only to respect but to obedience, regardless of their justice or injustice. In the name of democracy most men and women have been taught to abdicate from any personal sense of responsibility for the justice or injustice of the policies of 'their' government, policies that they either support or have failed to oppose with all the means at their disposal.

It is precisely in this area that the most radical break with established thinking and behavior patterns must be brought about, and soon, if real catastrophes are to be averted by way of realistic measures; for a continuing reliance on make-believe will not do, — the kinds of make-believe that have seemed to suit the short-term objectives of the vastly overprivileged corporate interests in our social order; the kinds of make-believe that we have been taught to swallow so obediently, like pleasant-tasting pills, sugarcoated with the cliches of modern liberalism.

If we want to survive as a human race it is necessary, first of all, to wake up to the hazards that confront us, and then to break out of the pseudoprotective cover of the democratic illusion. We must set increasing numbers of our young people, above all, free to the extent that they can declare our allegedly democratic system illegitimate, and attach their loyalty and commitment to something real — the sanctity of human lives, the cause of man's survival, or of the survival of humanity in man — instead of continuing, in the relatively new-fangled name of 'liberalism', or 'democracy', to follow the age-old trails of submission to flags and authorities, to law and order, to school drills and military drills.

But how can we as political theorists seek to promote such a radical change in political commitment? First of all, I submit, *by clarifying a viable alternative to the conventional pattern of loyalties*. And secondly, of course, *by way of showing up the more glaring fallacies of the conventional approach to citizenship.*

* Shortened version of a lecture presented to a conference in moral and political philosophy, hosted by the Ripon College Philosophy Department, and sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Council for Philosophical Studies. I have profited from critical comment on an earlier draft by two colleagues, Donald J. C. Carmichael and Thomas C. Pocklington, both at the University of Alberta; also, from our discussions at the Conference. The complete version is to be published in *Inquiry* no. 3, 1971.

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It is toward these two tasks that it becomes important to compare some consequences of contract theory and of freedom theory. For the contract theorists provided the most persuasive rationale, I believe, for the defense of democratic institutions, and of allegedly democratic institutions as well. If it can be shown that the assumptions of what is here called freedom theory are better suited to stimulate the development of citizens who will be serious-minded and therefore radical in political inquiry and action, then the task of destroying the submissiveness-producing effectiveness of the democratic myth, for increasing numbers of individuals, will have been advanced.

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There are at least three different basic approaches to theorizing about how to establish a good society, or how to do away with the worst evils of the present social order. First, there is the Marxist advocacy of revolution; the aim would be to establish a socialist or a communist economic system. Secondly, there is the course of trying to perfect the democratic system — by way of a better constitution, for example. Thirdly, there is the course of political education, to bring about new qualities of individual responsibility in leadership and in citizenship.

My own view is that the first course is probably necessary, but I shall not argue this position here. The thesis I wish to advance is that the second course alone is self-defeating, indeed does more harm than good when pursued on the national level; while a serious pursuit of the third course represents our best hope of building a future for man.

To put it in different words: I shall not argue here for a socialist economy or for a revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system; personally I believe these would probably be happy outcomes. But whether you agree or disagree with me about this is irrelevant to the position I shall argue; namely, that *a new approach to political education is the most realistic approach to radical change available to us at this time,* and that, if we are to move in this direction, *it is necessary first of all to make a clean break with the common liberal view that what is most needed are reforms of our electoral or representative system, or the like.*

Now, nobody is going to quarrel about the importance of man's survival on this earth. But as a second priority aim of politics, the perfection of a democratic system of government is often advocated by liberals. My argument here will not be that survival is more important than democracy, but that the protection and expansion of individual human rights is the *only* legitimate aim of politics, beyond the survival of humanity. Indeed, I shall argue that the task of perfecting a democratic system would be an aim of negative value because it would get in the way of the proper aims of expanding our basic human rights and of human survival.

II

The Most Basic Rights are, for the purposes of this paper, to stay (1) alive, (2) unmolested, and (3) free to develop according to inner propensities and potentialities. In that order.[1]

To stay alive is an absolute, and takes precedence over all other Rights, for its violation blots out all other possibilities. 'As long as there is life there is hope', in an objective sense at least, however dim the prospects.

To be 'unmolested' means first of all, for present purposes, not to be physically hurt without existential necessity. The concept seems clear enough at its core; lamentably, there can be no Right not to become ill or infirm by natural causes, but there should be a basic Right not to suffer illness or infirmity as a consequence of unjust conventions or of deliberate decisions by men.

Thirdly, 'free to develop according to inner propensities and potentialities'. This third tier of Most Basic Rights cannot readily be operationally defined, and yet it is a concept with empirical reference; and research and enlightened dialogue can seek to establish reasonable priorities of freedoms and seek consensus, first of all with respect to core priorities. Toward this end it is necessary to draw not only on the heritage of philosophical dialogue on the great issues of liberty and justice, but on the increasing body of empirical knowledge of the human species and the human condition —

historical and existential, psychological and social. In recent times, increasingly fruitful work on child development and on human development more generally has brightened the the prospects for a firmer establishment of priorities among freedoms — priorities corresponding to human need priorities, as these become progressively better established by research and inductive theory.

To summarize, while protection of human life must come first, the Most Basic Rights include also the preservation of the individual's physical integrity and his most essential liberties, or the freedoms most essential to his well-being and growth as a human being. I take the view that, beyond ensuring human survival, to protect and expand the MBR's is the only legitimate purpose of government, or of politics; every law and institution should be judged as a means to further this end. I have in other contexts called this the Human Rights Approach to politics, as a radical alternative to, say, the utilitarian or the democratic approaches.[2]

Only the term 'Most Basic Rights' remains to be defined — or, rather, the term 'Rights' in that particular context. The reference is obviously not to legal powers; nor is it to moral claims. 'Most Basic Rights' refers to high priority freedoms that *must be secured* by the state, to the fullest possible extent, for all individuals equally. Unlike privileges, Rights in this sense require that political redress be given first to those whose welfare has been most restricted. But the key point in the present conception of Rights is that Rights pose legitimate demands on the government, indeed on the political system, demands that must be met to the extent that this is empirically possible. In principle, the extent possible is to be determined by social and behavioral science, while the imperative of protecting and expanding these Rights, or whether it is obeyed, decides whether or to what extent a government or a legal system is legitimate, and should be obeyed by the citizenry.

The imperative itself is a conception not deduced from any particular political theory. It is itself as a goal the first premise of political theory, or, more precisely, a necessary implication of the first premise: that politics should serve human life — not certain lives only, but every human life, which is of infinite worth, and in this sense also, of course, of equal worth with every other human life.

III

Before going any further, let me offer a rough description of the essential characteristics of freedom theory: (1) the notion that all individuals should enjoy optimal security and freedom to live as they genuinely choose; (2) the idea that the state is at best a mere instrument to secure optimal freedom for all individuals; and (3) the idea that all individuals are equally entitled to optimal security and freedom, so that those who are relatively less privileged always must have a prior claim on the state for redress; it follows that laws which perpetuate inequality in levels of freedom are illegitimate, with no valid claim to be obeyed, either by the underprivileged or by anyone else who is aware of and resents injustice.

After Socrates' embryonic beginning, the first fullfledged freedom theorists were the early anarchists. William Godwin (1756—1836) saw the state not only as an enemy of man, but as virtually man's only enemy. Government, he wrote, 'is nothing more than a scheme for enforcing by brute violence the sense of one man or set of men upon another.' — '. . . With what delight must every well-informed friend of mankind look forward to the auspicious period, the dissolution of government, of that brute engine which has been the only perennial cause of the vices of mankind.'[3]

Godwin and the other early anarchists were not, of course, well-informed about present-day psychological, social, and economic knowledge; and their beautiful optimism about the feasibility of abolishing government and about the prospects for freedom and virtue to follow is certainly obsolete. But their scornful rejection of the legitimacy of the state, and by implication of any obligation to obey laws simply because they have been promulgated by the state, is worthy of consideration.

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state was a probably necessary evil, and there were many laws that he saw no reason to disobey. But the cardinal point in the outlook of this man, who first coined the phrase 'civil disobedience', was his insistence on being himself the judge of whether a law was acceptable or not, in terms of his own standards of justice. 'If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go, let it go . . . but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be an agent of injustice to another,[4] then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn.'[5]

In the political realm, the anarchist rejection of the state, or Thoreau's rejection of unjust laws, is in line with the existentialist rejection of the validity of religious and moral traditions. But, as Albert Camus (1913—60) wrote, the rebel is a person who rejects in order to affirm. 'He opposes what is preferable to what is not. Not every value entails rebellion, but every act of rebellion entails a value . . . Rebellion . . . is profoundly positive in that it reveals the part of man which must always be defended.'[6]

Camus was a man of letters and a moral philosopher; he was not a political theorist, for he never attempted in any systematic way to develop his profound insight into the nature and rationale of humanist rebellion in a political context; he developed neither a proposed path to political progress nor a systematic analysis of the obstacles to political justice. He castigated persuasively some casts of mind and some political movements as ruthless condoners of murder, but never came to grips with the awful dilemmas of how to govern in the service of radical justice without getting into a virtual state of war with the privileged groups that would stand to lose. Yet as a freedom theorist Camus was a creative innovator, whose importance for political theory probably will come to be widely recognized:[7]

(1) It makes a lot of difference to political theory where you start. Following Camus, if we start out rejecting all past rationalizations in defense of churches and political establishments, we can keep the individual in the center, as a being capable of rationality and entitled to free choice among possible value commitments and political loyalties.

(2) If by self-analysis or intuition you begin with the premise that life itself is infinitely valuable, for yourself and equally for others, so that murder and suicide become the extreme evils, a human 'essence' emerges. This 'essence' rules out, for the healthy person, anti-humanist political commitments, and predisposes him to become loyal to programs with humane aims as well as humane means.

(3) Rebellion, in Camus' sense of permanent revulsion and revolt against oppression, is called an essential dimension of life, in the healthy individual. In rebellion, he writes, consciousness is born: the consciousness of being an individual and of being a human being, with a sense of solidarity with all other men. 'I rebel, therefore we exist.'[8]

(4) A commitment to rebellion combines a radical attack on the legitimacy of existing institutions with a moderating necessity of weighing the human costs of open uprisings or other resort to violence against the human costs of prolonging established violence and oppression.

(5) A philosophical commitment to rebellion combines an absolutist resistance to oppression with a vaccination against all varieties of authoritarian or anti-authoritarian dogmatism, for the political conscience of the rebel takes its cues from the facts of oppression itself, never from the ideology of a state or a party. This is a theory of *permanent rebellion:* while the rebel at times must make common cause with revolutionaires, at the moment of victory for the revolution he must side with the new categories of victims; for while oppression may become less extreme with the new regime, it will not be abolished.

(6) Camus' concept of freedom combines a negative and a positive definition: man becomes free, in the positive sense of fulfilling himself, only to the extent that he becomes a champion of the oppressed, i.e. of all individuals whose freedom, in the negative sense of their being coerced or deprived, is violated. This concept of freedom is invulnerable, there-

fore, to Sir Isaiah Berlin's critique of other conceptions of positive freedom.[9]

(7) The full life requires, according to Camus, an optimal awareness of our own needs and those of others, along with an unshakeable predisposition to be revolted by and to revolt against all policies and conditions that destroy human beings, or severely limit the meeting of vital human needs, whether of a few or of a great many. This philosophy requires not only humane reactions to the facts of oppression, but a determined exertion of efforts to establish the facts.

Freedom theory, as epitomized in Camus, makes a different kind of political education possible, and necessary, compared to contract theory. The freedom theorist has no loyalty to any system that keeps producing unjust policies. His political obligation is to his fellow men, and to those who are most oppressed prior to all others.

As a practical matter, the freedom theorist may work within the system, and to that extent accept its rules; but he is never in a moral sense (as distinct from a legal sense) a servant of the system. If he strives to improve it, it is because he sees possible benefits for human rights; but he retains his freedom to weigh the probable costs and benefits of attacking the system from the outside, and to do so if this seems rational, either simultaneously with or subsequently to working inside the system, or he may choose to place all his eggs in the 'outside' basket, with the revolutionaries.

The freedom theorist is above all else personally responsible for his political acts, or failures to act, in the service of justice, in the sense of optimal freedom for all or optimal rights according to priorities in needs. This aim sets his norm system; laws, conventions, symbols are all in the realm of facts, some facilitating and others creating obstacles to be overcome. Allegedly democratic systems and the possibilities for their improvement are also, to the freedom theorist, categories of fact; and such facts assume value, positive or negative, as they come to bear on human needs and the prospects for meeting them, according to just priorities.

The contract theorist, as has been shown, cannot be as free to pursue the imperatives of justice, either in his life or in his teachings, already because he is committed to the prior preservation or improvement of a system of agreements. In the abstract this difference may not necessarily make much difference, if the assumed agreements are well-designed to serve freedom and justice; but in practice the contract approach is bound to influence the processes of political education toward acceptance of some political obligation to existing systems. And that can make a world of difference.

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No revolutionary cause is worth dying for, Camus wrote, unless it commits the new regime to the immediate abolition of capital punishment.[10] A contract theorist is bound to be more complacent, at least in principle, about the taking of human lives. His main concern is bound to be to respect majority decisions, even about human lives, while he works to make majoritarianism more real and more enlightened. Moreover, he will not, of course, support any revolutionary cause at all if there is real hope, however distant, that social injustice can be rectified by democratic or sort-of-democratic processes. But in the meantime many lives, especially in the ghettoes, if we are talking about the United States today, remain 'nasty, brutish and short.' — 'As for adopting the ways which the State has provided for remedying the evil,' wrote Thoreau, 'I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man's life will be gone.'[11] Indeed, many men's, women's and children's lives will be gone today, among those who are most desperately in need of justice, while we wait for public opinion to demand an end to the slaughter in Indochina, or to poverty in the USA.

Let us disregard, for a moment, the great cost of lives and freedom it would at best take to await the redemption of the democratic processes in North American society today; for example, the additional thousands of black or Chicano or Indian lives that will be stymied or destroyed while we wait for predominantly white electorates to bec
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white electorates to become enlightened and revolted enough to vote for radical changes. Let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that a rejuvenation of these electorates can bring about effective pressures for a more democratic Congress; for example, winds of change that send the dictatorial old Southern committee chairmen out to pasture and give idealistic younger legislators an opportunity to exert real power. Suppose that somehow these strong liberals by persuasion and electioneering could perform the near miracle of electing an administration of their choice, and establish, let us say, architects of a new, more radical New Deal in the White House as well as in Congress.

Such a development would no doubt in the short run reverse the ominous present trends toward political violence in the USA. More blacks and chicanos would come to believe in the system, more students and young graduates would accept it and work for it. There would develop a new sense of pride in being Americans. So far all this would be well and good.

But remember that the Roosevelt New Deal was followed by the Truman and Eisenhower regimes; by Hiroshima, the Cold War, McCarthyism and Vietnam. I believe disasters of this magnitude were bound to follow, and will follow again if once again we behave as liberals and stake our hopes on, say a Eugene McCarthy or a Robert F. Kennedy as a kind of leader that would rejuvenate our political system, without challenging its legitimacy and without a commitment to radically change the economic system. *In proportion as democratic processes will seem to reassert themselves in Washington, so will voter satisfaction reinforce complacency and make it easier again for the corporate interests to go to work to reassert their power, first behind the scenes and eventually more openly*. The cycle will run its course, and bright youngsters will once again seek their corrupting rewards in the corporate structure. Unlike the 1930's, or even the 1960's however, the 1970's may not make it possible for another youth movement to come to the rescue of the public interest, for the hazards that urgently require the best public-spirited intelligence and will-power today are both more lethal and harder to reverse than were those that faced us forty or even twenty years ago.

It is the very virtues of democratic liberalism that make it such a dangerous creed. Who would not want a democracy that really works, or a free enterprise system that would serve the public well, and also protect the small entrepreneurs against the big ones? The democratic illusion makes for wishful thinking; to be sure, good liberals work for and look forward to a 'more democratic' regime, but meanwhile they are content with appearances: they recognize the established system as legitimate and even defend it against radical challengers. Without the countless decent liberals to support our present system in the name of democracy, it could never have become such an immensely unjust and yet such a stable system, — the mighty global bulwark against oppressed peoples everywhere, in defense of the most over-privileged minorities anywhere, anytime.[12]

Political theorists seriously committed to freedom, or the Most Basic Rights, must in my view attack not only the practical liberal stance on our political scene, but as well the philosophical premises that determine this stance. And I have argued that assumptions derived from the mainstream of social contract theory, in America reinforced by John Locke's influence and by the historical context in which the Federal Republic emerged, have played a large if often implicit role in shaping the liberal outlook.

I shall not argue, however, that the more strongly a liberal is attached to social contract theory, the less he will care about human rights. The late Alexander Meiklejohn certainly was one of the most outspoken champions of civil liberties all his life, and a completely uncompromising foe of Joseph McCarthy in a period when many liberals spoke softly. Yet it is significant that Meiklejohn was chiefly concerned with the liberties necessary for self-government, above all the freedom of political speech; he was less prominently associated, if at all, with the rights most essential to man's existence, such as the right not to be executed, or even the right to refuse military service.

Meiklejohn and his followers must be called strong civil libertarians, but in my view there are more urgent priorities among rights. As a freedom theorist one is bound to consider most urgent the Most Basic Rights; i.e. the priorities among rights must be determined by the hierarchy among needs, in which existence itself must come first, and then freedom from crippling violence or economic deprivation.

To the freedom theorist, to conclude, free speech on public issues is *an* important right because human life is the ultimate value — life itself first, and then life in freedom to develop and to express one's individuality. This makes free speech valuable but not as valuable as, say, freedom from physical violence. The practical difference this choice can make can be illustrated by this example: if it is concluded (after as careful inquiry as is possible) that free speech on our campuses by military recruiters, or even by the President, in fact contributes to destroying additional lives in Indochina, then to try to curb or disturb such speech would from a freedom theory perspective be a lesser evil than to tolerate it, in the name of civil liberties. From a contract theory point of view the opposite conclusion would seem to follow. Meiklejohn, for one, deduces the value of free speech on politics not from the value of life and liberty in general, it will be recalled, but from 'the necessities of the program of self-government'.[13]

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I believe I have shown that freedom theory, unlike contract theory, not only directs all its normative emphasis to optimal human rights as the legitimate aim of politics; it also structures the priorities among rights according to human needs, not political system requirements. It remains to be shown that freedom theory also differs from contract theory in that it provides a new approach to political education, which will not only support progress in the Most Basic Rights but will as well improve the prospects for the survival of the human species.

To become as effective as one can in improving the prospects for human survival, as a leader or as a citizen, requires at least two qualities: first, a very strong concern for the future of man, or of humanity, strong enough to sustain diligent and prolonged efforts to become aware of and realistic about our condition, with its hazards as well as its possibilities; strong enough also to override other concerns. Secondly, what is required is to act on the knowledge accumulated. In this sense radical inquiry is required, as well as political action as rationality dictates.

Is this what the conventional liberal education prepares us for? On the contrary, the emphasis is on socializing us into the largely passive roles of law-abiding citizenship; and secondly, what is worse, most of us are made to swallow the democratic myth, i.e. the assumption that as voters 'we, the people' (if we are over 21, or 18, as the case may be), are the ultimate rulers, so that it is mainly our own fault if the system goes awry.

Consider for a moment what Sigmund Freud had to say about religious instruction in the schools, in *The Future of an Illusion*. Not only is it unfortunate, he wrote, that the children in their religious outlook come to rely on authority instead of being free to develop their own insights and commitments. These classes discouraged doubt and demands for evidence in support of beliefs, and with this kind of short-circuiting approach to knowledge tended to sabotage the strenous efforts in other classes to develop a critical intelligence in children, an inclination to question all authoritative beliefs that are communicated without real evidence, and especially communications in defiance of evidence or common sense.

It is on similar grounds that I attack the usual liberal democratic citizenship training such as it now usually operates, in most of our high schools and colleges. There are mountains of evidence to show that not democracy but oligarchy, or at best 'polyarchies' of interests with common stakes in preserving our economic system, describe the real state of political affairs in this country (and probably in every other so-called democratic country).[14] By continuing to foster the myth of democracy, not only do we tend to make those who are taken in complacent in the belief that they live in the

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I submit that the *beginning* to freeing our political intelligence, or that of young people, is to encourage dissatisfaction about rights poorly achieved, not satisfaction with largely illusory qualities of a political system. Meiklejohn and others surely would agree this far, but I also assert that dissatisfaction about rights (poorly) achieved is far more useful than dissatisfaction about democracy (poorly) achieved. For in the former case, civil disobedience and other radical political action is morally permissible and indeed necessary, because it is no virtue to be patient about injustice suffered by others. In the latter case, only patience, and intensified political education toward reform of the system, without action outside the system, can be counselled.

It makes a world of difference in the freeing of men's minds to work effectively on survival issues, too, whether or not citizens have become conditioned to feel unconditionally bound by apparent, or even real, majority decisions coming out of (apparent or real) democratic processes. Not only is it in our time much clearer than before that majorities cannot be depended on to defend even the most basic liberties of unpopular majorities. But the magnitude of the 'private affluence/public squalor' dilemma, to use John Kenneth Galbraith's phrase,[15] has swollen until the need for a redress of this balance is no longer merely a matter of justice to the non-affluent but a matter of survival for the entire human race. The accelerating destruction of air, water and soil and subsequently of animal and human tissue is the price humanity as a whole has to pay for centuries of private exploitation of the earth's resources, along with the withering away of politics, in Plato's sense of defense of the public interest.

On such empirical grounds alone it would seem clear, whether one's salient concern is with the vindication of all men's Most Basic Rights or with the continuation of human life on this planet, that responsible citizenship is urgently required; and so is also, therefore, the kind of political education that will help produce it. As Robert Pranger shows in his *Eclipse of Citizenship,* conventional political socialization prepares students only for passive participant roles in the games of political power that go on under the pretense of democracy.[16] I would call this *training* in thought and behavior, not education; a type of training programmed to help perpetrate our present system of make-believe democracy.

'Political education', as I would define the term (similarly to Pranger), should refer to the freeing of intellect and conscience to that the individual can choose his own ideals and commitments freely, and learn to realistically evaluate in this light the existing institutions and policies; as well as learn to act to change what needs to be changed. Political education in this sense is much more feasible in this country now than in many other countries, certainly including those in the communist world; but we are not working at it, in part because we are so busily training our new citizens 'for democracy'.

To the extent that we can set our youngsters free (or tolerate the freedom that many of them have already grabbed, often at great costs to themselves) to choose their own values, and their own kind of society to work for, I believe the value of life itself will come to be chosen, most often, as the basic normative point of departure. From there on, it is a matter of learning to work with logic and evidence, to get to the position where one rejects the legitimacy of our political system and then goes to work to change it, from the inside *and* the outside, in the interest of human rights as well as human survival. It is *natural,* I believe, in the sense of being responsive to our most basic, indeed existential, human needs, to value human life over all other values; but to become dependably able to think and act naturally, in this sense, one must first become free to reject all special-purpose theologies, political isms, and conventional musts and mustnots in the realm of thought. Beyond a compassionate commitment to human life, or all human lives, all that either the cause of Survival or the cause

of Human Rights requires is intelligence, scientific and common sense knowledge, and the courage to act right.

NOTES

1 This is a relatively narrow construction of 'the right to life'. For a closely argued defense of a somewhat broader construction, consult H. A. Bedau, 'The Right to Life', *The Monist 52* (1968), pp. 550–72.

2 See especially Bay, C. 1970 (1958), *The Structure of Freedom,* Stanford University Press, p. 7 and *passim*.

3 Godwin,W. 1925 (1793), *An Enquiry Conserning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness*. Knopf, N.Y. Vol I, pp. 126 and Vol. II, p. 71.

4 'Another' could be your neighbor, or a Negro slave, or a Mexican war victim.

5 Thoreau, H. D. 1960, 'On the Duty of Civil Disobedience' (first published 1848) in *Walden and On the Duty of Civil Disobedience*. New American Library (Signet Classic), p. 229.

6 Camus, A. 1958, *The Rebel*. Knopf (Vintage), N.Y. *(L'Homme Revolte* first published 1951), pp. 14, 19.

7 Cf. my book review 'Camus as Political Thinker', *Canadian Forum 50* (1970), pp. 66–67; and Willhoite, F. H. Jr. 1968, *Beyond Nihilism: Albert Camus's Contribution to Political Thought,* Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge.

8 Op. cit., p. 22.

9 Berlin, I. 1958, *Two Concepts of Liberty*. Oxford University Press.

10 Op. cit., p. 292.

11 Op. cit., p. 229.

12 Any challenge to this judgment must challenge the validity of the following observations also: Much less than one tenth of the world's population consumes over 40 % of the world's food, in a nation with almost as lopsided a distribution of economic privileges domestically; and the ruling strata of this nation control the largest military establishment the world has ever seen, which is prepared to rain death and destruction over any small nation, and perhaps any racial minority at home, that would seem to threaten its corporate power structure.

13 Meiklejohn, A. 1960, *Political Freedom*. Harper, N.Y. , p. 27.

14 Cf. Walker J. L. 1967, 'A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy' in McCoy, A. & Playford, J. (eds.): *Apolitical Politics*. Crowell, N.Y., pp. 199–219, and the literature referred to in his footnote 2 on pp. 199–200.

15 Galbraith has written forcefully on the problem: 'In particular, we must find a way to remedy the poverty which afflicts us in public services and which is in such increasingly bizarre contrast with our affluence in private goods.' Galbraith, J. K. 1962, *The Affluent Society*. Penguin, Harmondsworth first publised 1958), p. 249.

16 Pranger, R. 1968, *Eclipse of Citizenship*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, N.Y.

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