

Department of Political Economy
U of Toronto
Tor 7, Ont

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CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY*

by Christian Bay **

I

That learned journal from south of the border, and from Canada, Time Magazine, not long ago carried a report on Mr. Ralph Nader and his far-flung activities, which have contributed to raising the blood pressure levels of so many corporate executives and other establishment figures, all the way from his first major targets in General Motors to the many supposedly public servants he has favored with his special attention more recently. Time quotes Mr. Nader -- and this quote may well be authentic, in spite of Time's common practice of fabricating its own quotations to make sure they are appropriate and pleasing to the reader -- as follows: "The people of regulatory agencies are utterly confounded when we come to investigate them. They have forgotten what citizens look like."¹

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**Department of Political Science, University of Alberta.

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So have, of course, most of us, and certainly the bulk of the political science profession. In our habitual eagerness to be of service to our fellow men, and keep our place in the sun, too, among the affluent, the secure, and the well respected, we have as a profession found it convenient to assume that what is good for the state is good for our fellow men; indeed, we have been playing the same game, if covered with better protective verbiage, as a former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, did when he said that what is good for General Motors is good for the country.

However, I believe many of us are ready at this point to reassess our thinking about citizenship, and indeed our thinking about the nature of politics as well as the proper objectives of political scientists. A greening of the social sciences has been in progress, if I may use Charles A. Reich's phrase, and we are unlikely to witness again for some time to come the general acceptance, only a few years ago, of the notion that the task of social scientists is to study "the" facts and leave it to our "elected" leaders to decide, as "representatives of the people" what to do about the facts established. Behind the veil of the value-free social science our professions became of service not so much to the people or to humanity, as our pretense remained, as to the highest bidder; and much the same had become true of other sections of the university communities. "Service", Theodore Roszak has written, "by becoming a blanket willingness to do whatever society will pay for, has led the university to surrender the indispensable characteristic of wisdom: moral discrimination. So it is that

the multiversity progressively comes to resemble nothing so much as the highly refined, all-purpose brothel Jean Genet describes in his play The Balcony."²

On the other hand, if all the rest of society is run on the same principle, of providing whatever services that are demanded and paid for, without much evidence of moral discrimination, then the academic professions should perhaps not be so harshly condemned for sharing the same life of easy virtue. However, as I shall develop in this paper, I believe academics today have an unprecedented opportunity to practice and to teach effectively a new kind of citizenship, one that incorporates moral discrimination, and one that can produce the kind of political community that eventually can take us out of the brothel of commercial service-orientation that now prevails in our society, outside as well as inside academic institutions.

Perhaps we might want to object, though, that high-class brothels are really not all that unpleasant, if one is blessed with sufficient affluence. Granted, if the alternative is joyless, authoritarian puritanism. But by the time I am finished I hope to show that there are other, more viable alternatives on the horizon, capable of attracting pleasure-seekers as well as moralists (and most of us, I suspect, combine both orientations). I believe in the possibility of developing political communities, inside and outside our schools and

²"On Academic Delinquency" in Roszak (ed.) The Dissenting Academy, New York: Pantheon, 1967, p. 12.

universities, by way of a now suddenly viable new approach to citizenship education, which is radically at odds with our traditional approaches. What is more, I believe this new approach is bound to replace, within decades, the existing ways, and that in any event this development may well be irreversible, unless some catastrophe of genocidal proportions catches up with us first.

In this paper I shall focus on our situation here in North America, although most of what I have to say applies to Western Europe as well, and, within a longer time perspective, to the communist world and the Third world also.

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I shall begin (II) with definitions of key terms, -- first of all "political consciousness", and then "political community", "citizenship", and "political education." In the same part of my presentation I shall state, briefly and dogmatically, a few assumptions regarding the nature of politics and of political inquiry; these "first premises" will, I hope, serve to justify or at least explain my conceptual choices, in terms of the requirements of my particular line of inquiry.

Next (III) comes a discussion of two conflicting kinds of theories about trends and prospects for political consciousness in our world in the present period, with Professor Charles A. Reich and Marshal Lin Piao as their respective spokesmen. The rapid demise of the North American New Left appears to have been triggered by a clash between the same two kinds of theory, or of political style; but I

shall ask whether bridges across this apparent abyss may become possible.

Then follows (IV) a discussion of the concepts and the competing processes of political socialization and of political education, and an attempt to identify some variables that nowadays increasingly seem to favor continuing advances in political education.

Finally (V) I shall seek to draw some tentative conclusions regarding trends in and prospects for citizenship behavior and conceptions of political community, -- small-scale, large-scale, and international. I shall pay particular attention to educational communities as agencies of change in political consciousness.

II

"Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy," wrote Plato, ". . . cities will never have rest from their evils. . ."³ In our so-called democratic age we are much worse off, in some respects, than in, say, Jeremy Bentham's world of a century and half ago. In his time, "democracy" referred to a noble dream. In our time the word refers to a system of false pretensions that keeps philosophers in their place, "democratically" ruled by men with little concern for philosophy in the Socratic sense, -- or for democracy in the classical sense.

The young Bentham, until his forties, was no democrat. He felt it would be easier to civilize, with his own philosophy,

³Republic, Book V, 473. New York: Random House. Modern Library, (no year indicated), p. 203.

a benevolent despot than a Parliament, -- especially a pluralist, faction-ridden House of Commons. But his friend James Mill eventually seduced Bentham away from Plato and made him a convinced democrat, on the fanciful premise that an expanding suffrage would make Parliament more responsive than any King would be to the best interests of the majority of the people.

Plato was far more realistic than the Mill-Bentham team in assessing the vital necessity of a viable political philosophy, in the sense of detached, enlightened rationality in the service of justice, to the welfare of the cities of Man. And we are still suffering badly, I believe, from the eclipse of Plato by the lesser breed of utilitarian, common sense-oriented philosophers, including our contemporary liberal pluralists.

Yet we cannot resurrect Plato to the extent of going along with his kind of state, which would reserve political consciousness to a select few. This much good, at least, the advance of utilitarian and liberal ideas has given us. But I think we tend to forget that Plato lived in an age of extreme scarcity, and therefore did not have the democratic options open to those of us today who wish to champion the integrity of political philosophy as well as the welfare and freedom of all men equally.

What we can aim at in our time, with all the economic (as distinct from political and psychological) problems of scarcity overcome, is to find ways to expand political consciousness to the majority, or at least to sufficiently many so that the worst, most tyrannical

frauds under the pretense of democratic government will become progressively less feasible. In a word, we can seek new ways to establish a more genuine political consciousness on a much wider scale than ever before attempted; if all men and women cannot become full-fledged philosophers and kings, I shall argue in this paper that possibly most men and women, and almost certainly most youngsters privileged to study civics or politics, can, if we do our job as imaginative educators, in time become politically conscious and effective citizens.

Now, "political consciousness" is a term that has been and is used with so many meanings that the choice among conventionally legitimate definitions is wide indeed. For present purposes, the term will refer to a person's degree of autonomous, activist concern for vital political issues. "Autonomy" is in principle measured by degree of independence of (not the same, of course, as disagreement with) either conventional wisdom or ideologically closed systems of political thought, or isms. "Activism" refers to degree of readiness to act, even at the cost of inconvenience, harm or danger to oneself or one's tangible interests. "Political issue" refers to "any discrepancy between what is and what ought to be, in a community, a society, or the world, in so far as this discrepancy appears reducible by way of appropriate educational and organizational efforts." "Vital" here refers to any political issue involving, actually or partially, the welfare, security or freedom of one or more individuals.

Any existentially unnecessary threat to a human being's health or life raises, on this criterion, a major political issue,

which is perceived as such to the extent that citizens are politically conscious. The sad existing state of affairs is, of course, that political consciousness is woefully lacking in our society, as in most other societies; not only are lives lost or stymied every day which could have been saved or kept healthy had our political and economic institutions been geared to priorities of human rights ahead of property rights; but, perhaps as a reflection of these same priorities, ordinarily very few citizens are politically conscious enough to raise public issues in order to forestall or avoid repetition of needless personal tragedies, or even tragedies that kill or waste many lives. The conventionally taught response to most tragedies involving strangers is, if not frank indifference, a small financial contribution and then at most a charitable expression of concern, divorced from any thought of political remedies.

Our "cities will never have rest from their evil," to paraphrase Plato (above, p. 5), until citizens become politically conscious and therefore prone to political activism against oppression. Yet we must face the sociological fact of life that all large social organizations, and in particular, all states and other really large corporations, spawn extremely powerful vested interests not only in perpetuating oppression and murder but also in forestalling political consciousness, by way of encouraging instead (a) an apolitical or (b) a pseudopolitical or (c) a grossly uncritical would-be political consciousness (say, a Christian-mission-supportive approach to helping the South American Indians, or the Vietnamese). As one would expect,

civics instruction in our schools tends to be largely self-congratulatory in style, teaching our youngsters how and why our so-called democratic institutions here in Canada are better than all others, perhaps excepting those of Great Britain, instead of seeking to expand political consciousness by emphasizing the inequities of our system and seeking to stimulate a determination to work to improve it.

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And here, before proceeding to define the other key terms, let me simply state very briefly, without discussion, several assumptions regarding the nature of politics and of political inquiry:

(1) Political activity ought to be concerned primarily with objectives of justice, and ought therefore constantly to seek to curb the powers and privileges of those who own or control disproportionate resources, in order to come to the aid of the underprivileged and those who cannot protect their own rights, including the inarticulate, the impoverished, the sick, and the generations unborn.

(2) Governmental activity in any stable state or corporation will pay lip service to objectives of justice but tends in fact to promote the interests of already privileged strata, in order to further expand their powers and privileges. This is how the so-called free enterprise system works, in politics as well as in economics.

(3) The kind of lip service favored in our country manipulates symbols of "democracy", "liberty", "Christianity", etc., as a way of promoting uncritical patriotism and conservative complacency, and as

a way of forestalling the development of (autonomous, activist) political consciousness. Schools and other mass media are utilized for this purpose, among other purposes; for the states and the provinces as well as the largest private corporations, or rather their governments and executives, prefer pliable apoliticals or pseudopoliticals willing "to play the game" to politically conscious citizens, for obvious reasons.

(4) Political inquiry ought to doggedly pursue studies of how the mighty sociological tendencies toward oppression and violence to underdogs can be countered; or of how the fraudulent usage of symbols like "democracy", "justice" or "freedom" can be exposed; or of how effective counter-elites who champion the underdogs can be nurtured and made effective; or indeed of how revolutionary changes can be brought about with minimal cost and optimal benefits for social justice and individual freedom for all.

(5) Political inquiry has in fact too often come to serve, not blatantly but in the sense of value-neutral behavioralism, the short-term, short-sighted but for the moment insistent private interests, i.e., pseudopolitical purposes. Disgracefully many political scientists have supported, in their work or as citizens, even the most extreme negations of civilized politics, like the war in Vietnam, or other counter-insurgency activities directed against the poor in Latin America and other parts of the world.

(6) To reform political inquiry and make it morally and scientifically acceptable is a far more feasible task, in our lifetime,

than to even begin to reform and civilize the politics of our governments and our large private corporations. Yet to work on improving the caliber of political inquiry can represent a beginning toward the larger challenge, by way of trying to build politically conscious and increasingly effective counter-elites. (?)

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The remaining key concepts to be discussed here can be defined briefly, since they will be subject to more thorough scrutiny in the two last parts of this paper:

"Community" will refer to any social system in which there is a shared sense of identity with its welfare or, reduced to the simplest criterion, a "we-feeling" predominating, rather than a "they-feeling". Operationally one would establish whether a neighborhood is a community, or for what purposes, if any, it is a community, by way of surveys or participant observation.

"Political community" will refer to any community in which there is political consciousness; there is, then, no clear borderline between political and apolitical communities, and the researcher must draw the operational line for determining inclusion and exclusion from this category according to his own theory and research purposes.

"Citizenship" has above (p. 7) been related to political consciousness, and in turn to "politically alive and responsible" participation in political contests and controversies. In Gabriel A. Almond's terms, though he might not agree to this usage, we are all citizens as well as subjects as well as parochials, though in different mixes; very few of us, for example, behave as citizens to the same degree that a Ralph Nader does.

For present purposes, at least, let us depart from the tradition that by definition relates citizenship/^{exclusively} to the state. A Ralph Nader works with the legal instrumentalities of the state and within the limits of the laws established and tended by the state, but his concern is to improve the quality of the American society, or indeed the American national community, rather than the efficacy of the state. Let me try the following formulation:

"Citizenship" will here refer to politically conscious participation in resolving or seeking to influence the resolution of vital political issues (above, p. 7). Ordinarily the strategy of citizenship will be to influence or to seek to replace those who hold legal power, in the state or the city or the corporation, but the citizen may alternatively, for example, choose to concentrate his energies on promoting political education, without direct purposes of action or of influencing governmental action on specific issues.

"Political education" will here refer to the processes of setting the individual free, and of giving him the tools of relevant knowledge and of effective articulation, so that he may bring his own autonomously developing perspectives on the worthy purposes

of human social life to bear on political issues. Political education provides tools for inquiry as well as commitment to action, and has failed unless there is continuing tension between the two; indeed, unless there is a permanent internal dialogue between a critical openness regarding all commitments to means as well as to specific formulations of ends, and an overriding determination to support humane, life-protecting ends. A lively dialogue between individuals is of course essential in supporting the politically educated person's internal dialogues.

III

I have on past occasions expressed some optimism about the future of citizenship in North America. More precisely, I have predicted that a new breed of citizen, or a new, more politically conscious kind of citizenship will become increasingly common in the future. And as a political theorist I have wanted to lend a hand, by way of proposing the kind of definition of "citizenship" that has just been restated. Empirically speaking, I have extrapolated anticipations of expanding political consciousness from recent trends toward political activism among students as well as among ethnic minority group members, especially blacks in the United States.⁴ At this writing

⁴See my "Student Political Activism: Here to Stay?" Our Generation. Vol. 5 (1967), No. 1, pp. 50-73; and "Law, Justice, and Society," in C.S. Wallia (ed.) Toward Century 21: Technology, Society and Human Values. New York: Basic Books, 1970, Ch. 18, pp. 213-36.

the various Women's Liberation groups have certainly provided additional evidence for expecting a continuing rise in levels of political consciousness in North America.

Yet my own continuing sense of optimism is pale and qualified indeed when compared to the glad tidings communicated by Charles A. Reich in The Greening of America,⁵ a book that for many months remained the No. 1 bestseller in the United States, according to the weekly listings of the New York Times.

Reich's work is bound to have quite an impact on American and Canadian political consciousness for some time, an impact that, I believe, in time will rival or exceed the influence of such important earlier works as David Riesman et.al.'s The Lonely Crowd, William F. Whyte's The Organization Man, and John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society. This is an empirical statement, which implies no judgment on the relative merit of these books.

"Greening" is a term likely to become widely used in its Reichean sense,⁶ just as the other three titles have already enriched our vocabulary of popular sociologisms. And the terms "consciousness I" and II and III are bound to become the subject of perhaps never-ending conversational pastimes. Yet the importance of new snap terms is in itself trivial. Charles Reich's political impact may well come

⁵ New York: Random House, 1970.

⁶ Cf. for example "The Greening of Nicholas Johnson," in Rolling Stone, No. 79, April 1, 1971. (Also, above p. 2).

to exceed that of the three others, I believe, largely because his book alone is a radical book, with a challenge to promote revolutionary changes. More than that, it presents a confident prophecy of vast changes in progress, or changes about to come on a vast scale, and it very persuasively undercuts various premises crucial to the defenses of the conventional thinking about politics.

Now, it would be unfair to judge the book as a study of or even a tract on political theory. It is not intended to be. It is a religious work, extolling humanism, non-violence, and, above all else, an authentic life style, with the courage as well as the wisdom to achieve individual wholeness and autonomy. In its eschatology the book is as simple to comprehend and yet as visionary, as hope-inspiring, and as compelling as Marxism must be, in its less esoteric varieties, to oppressed populations at the dawn of their political consciousness. Yet Reich's audience is different. He belongs to the world's oppressor class, the affluent Americans, who are themselves oppressed not by sweatshops or sub-subsistence wages, but by a false consciousness, he argues, and ultimately by the impersonal tyranny of advanced technology, including the modern technology of organizational behavior.

"There is a revolution coming," Reich announces. "It will not be like revolutions of the past. It will originate with the individual and with culture, and it will change the political structure only as its final act. It will not require violence to succeed, and it cannot be successfully resisted by violence . . . This is the revolution of

the new generation."⁷ He assures us that a higher reason, a more human community, and a new and liberated individual will be the result.

Reich's work is on balance very good news, I think, precisely because it will stimulate very basic doubts about the morality and even the pragmatic workability of the traditional American or Canadian way of life, the square America that Richard M. Nixon symbolizes even better, perhaps, than Lyndon B. Johnson, and Spiro Agnew even more stridently than Nixon; I suppose W. A. C. Bennett and the late Ross Thatcher would be among the closest Canadian approximations.

Yet the fatal weakness in Reich is his apparent innocence about the sociology and psychology of power, and therefore about the nature of political processes. He carries this particular naivete to the point of anticipating the day, even if only half in earnest, when hippies will man the FBI.⁸

What is worse, he has no message to all the worst-off victims of American military and racist oppression, who will hardly be cheered by the news that Reich's revolution "cannot be successfully resisted by violence." A different, as badly needed revolution has been going on in Vietnam for more than 25 years, and the massive American counter-insurgency violence has by now all but flattened the country, with killings and destruction approaching genocidal and ecodical proportions. It is one thing to feel confident that this very ugly America is going

⁷ P. 4 and dust-jacket.

⁸ Ibid., p. 314.

to become transformed into a beautiful, civilized, peace-loving America, even in our own life-time; it is quite another thing to preach doing your own thing in the meantime, to overprivileged youngsters who can well afford, if their conscience is flattened, or underdeveloped, to sit and wait for the Greening to come, while many more additional victims see their hopes crushed or their loved ones killed every day.

The quest for freedom that Reich extols represents a genuine liberation from the false consciousness of technology-subservient liberal pluralism, and to the extent that his predictions are realistic we must welcome a healthy erosion, with the arrival of Consciousness III, of many myths that have kept the American warfare state going, and in Canada have made us accept complicity with American aggressive wars, social injustice and industrial destruction of nature with complacency. But there is one vital element lacking as much in Consciousness III as in Consciousness II and Consciousness I, and that is a commitment to moral discrimination (above, p. 2). I grant that the liberated souls that have arrived in Consciousness III are likely to become more fully human, also in the sense of developing powers of empathy and a sense of justice uncommon at the Consciousness I and Consciousness II levels, but in the culture of Consciousness III there is no clear sense of commitment to the welfare of outsiders, or even to the welfare of the outright victims of the same evil system that by its fruits of affluence has made doing your own thing possible within the privileged strata of the world's upper class, the bulk of

which lives in North America.

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According to traditional marxist theory, political consciousness will emerge from the exploited proletariats of the world, and will give them the will and the power, in time, to crush the capitalist oppressors. Marx writes in Capital, in a famous passage: the "Along with/constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in number, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself . . . The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated."⁹

Marx underestimated the resourcefulness of the capitalists, and also failed to anticipate the emergence of that new breed, the liberal capitalists, of whom Franklin Delano Roosevelt is the most archetypical example: men who were able to protect the free enterprise anarchists against themselves, by curbing some of their most self-destructive habits (example: F.D.R.'s Food and Drug Administration placed a few curbs on the common practice of seeking faster prof-

⁹From Karl Marx. Capital. Vol I. Chapter 32, reprinted in C. Wright Mills. The Marxists. New York: Dell, 1962, p. 69.

its by poisoning the consumers, a practice that is a little like killing the hen that keeps laying the golden eggs). Secondly, the liberals in the U.S., much like the Liberals in Canada, achieved real mastery in manipulating democratic symbols and in appearing to fight the capitalist system, or at least the powers of the monopolies and oligopolies. Thirdly, the increasing productive capacities of the industrial plant, above all in the United States, made it possible to increase the standards of living of large sections of the working class, indeed to an extent that many labour unions were co-opted and came to serve much the same political functions, on some kinds of issues at least (e.g., the Vietnam war) that the Communist Manifesto anticipated that the Lumpen-proletariat would serve, -- a likely "bribed tool of reactionary intrigue".

In these respects Marx was a fallible prophet. But the most important factor he underestimated was that of imperialism, and he certainly failed to anticipate its present stage, with one capitalist superpower, the United States, militarily and symbolically¹⁰ protecting all the giant national and international corporations, financial and industrial, in their far-flung activities; this has added up to the same polarization between rich and poor internationally as Marx anticipated within the most advanced capitalist countries. Today it seems to be the Chinese communist leadership that most

¹⁰By way of internationally competitive mass media, including Time and Reader's Digest; words like "communism" are used very effectively as scarewords, and this helps to forestall, in each country reached, any politically significant empathy for or solidarity with the oppressed in other countries.

clearly and explicitly recognizes the international nature of today's class struggle, and Marshal Lin Piao's much publicized speech of September, 1965, entitled "Long Live the Victory of People's War", merits a close study in spite of its far-out Mao-worshipping verbiage.¹¹

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There are large elements of truth, I believe, both in Reich's Greening of America and in Lin Piao's "Greening of the World". Both theories forecast, in a sense, the coming of the Promised Land; both are hopeful about the emergence of a new political Consciousness, though their uses of that concept differ in emphasis, with Reich stressing individual autonomy and Lin Piao stressing activist political commitment.¹² Reich anticipates something like a "revolution without tears", while Lin Piao foresees "many more Vietnams", with immense new suffering. Most crucial, I think, is the conflict between the two theories of the coming revolutions in consciousness: Reich assigns to / ^{the} most privileged youth of the United States the historical role of the (unorganized) vanguard for the new, more civilized society ahead; while Lin Piao, in line with Marx and Lenin, assigns to communist parties (Marxist-Leninist) that role, with the exploited peasantries and proletariats as their most fertile recruitment grounds.

¹¹Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965.

¹²"Political consciousness" is in this paper defined as "a person's degree of autonomous, activist concern for vital political issues." Above, p.7)

It is interesting, and from my own point of view tragic, that the Students for a Democratic Society, the last decade's by far most important radical movement among American academic youth, exploded and fragmented in a violent clash between two styles of politics, one inspired by the currents on which Reich's philosophy draws, and the other explicitly Maoist, committed to Mao's and to Lin Piao's theory of world revolution. As a result, the militant left in North America is again back to its apparently normal stage of grandiose ambitions in the realm of fantasy and factional bickering and political impotence in the realm of fact.

The New Left may be dead, for the moment, as a viable political force; or it may be slumbering. I prefer the second hypothesis, and I believe the way to test it out, over the next few years, is to seek a common ground between the revolutionary marxists and the self-liberating forces in North America that Reich represents and describes. While the current personal styles associated with the two approaches to politics, indeed to life, are radically different, I believe their ultimate commitments are not dissimilar. In other words, the contrasting styles may reflect radically different perceptions of empirical realities rather than normative incompatibilities.

But if this is so, then what do we have a political science for, if not to try to resolve the outstanding empirical issues, so that we may hope to come closer to a common ground that would permit an alliance, or even a ^{joining} / of the forces that seek to free mankind from oppression and injustice?

Obviously I shall not get very far in the remainder of this paper, even toward clarifying the terms of the issues that most badly need to be resolved. But in all brevity I shall consider two pairs of concepts that in my opinion bear crucially on the prospects for coming revolutions in consciousness, whether Marxist or Reichian: one pair is "community" and "citizenship"; the other is "education" and "socialization."

IV

First consider the concept of "political socialization", -- of fairly recent vintage, and yet the last decade has seen what must now be over a hundred books and papers on political socialization. The term has very quickly come to refer to a field of study as well as a process of becoming a citizen.

"Political socialization, in the broadest sense," writes Kenneth P. Langton, "refers to the way society transmits its political culture from generation to generation." However, as he continues, at times "the socialization process can be a vehicle of political and social change."

And he settles for the following, actually fairly representative definition, for the purposes of his book: "the process, mediated through various agencies of society by which an individual learns politically relevant attitudinal dispositions and behavior patterns."¹³

¹³Political Socialization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 4-5.

"Agencies of society" is a broad enough concept to include not only obvious things like schools, mass media, churches, military forces (for draftees, anyway), and a variety of private and public organizations; also the family, the peer group, or even ideologies or philosophies with conventional support could, I suppose, be considered "agencies of society" for the purposes of political socialization. In a narrower, perhaps more plausible sense, one might limit the reference to (1) the "natural" family and peer group and neighborhood, plus (2) the various kinds of organizations of which the individual becomes a member, like schools, churches, military forces, political parties, unions, associations, plus (3) media of communication to which the individuals become exposed, either by choice, by accident, or involuntarily, or by some hybrid mix of causative factors.

Now, if we consider each individual child a potentially unique person, whose inherent powers obviously will develop more fully under some conditions rather than others, then it must be almost certainly true that every specific socialization experience, over the years that it takes "to grow up", is bound to exact a price; inevitably, some of the potentialities of the child, including socially valuable potentialities, are bound to be lost or stymied along the way. But I take it that we all in principle believe that as much of the child's health and psychological freedom and individuality should be rescued as is compatible with living together in a fairly non-violent, socially responsible way.

But consider for a moment the basic assumptions about the

nature of politics that I have sketched out above, and especially the proposition that every stable state or large enough private corporation will in fact work to promote the interests of already privileged strata. Philip Selznick and other sociologists of organizational behavior have carried further the tradition of studies inaugurated by Robert Michels, and more sophisticated and better supported versions of his "iron law of oligarchy" are now generally accepted by sociologists, at least with respect to this fundamental fact of sociological life: Every social organization, proportionately to its size, wealth, and its membership's degree of commitment to it or to its main objectives, will tend to develop strong oligarchical tendencies, so that any interest on the part of members in democratic procedures will be offset, in fact if not in pretense, by the leadership's efforts, from a far superior position of control of events (including information), to perpetuate and further bolster its own powers and privileges.

States are normally extremely large corporations, and superpower states are so large that any prospects of democratic controls are doomed to frustration, at least if opponents scrupulously stick to the established "rules of the game" as, for example, American liberals and Canadians of the major political parties traditionally have done. On top of everything else, unlike private corporation executives, however powerful, the political regimes of states also control the symbols of patriotism as well as the police and the military forces in a pinch -- and a nervous government was in such a pinch here in Canada not long ago. And the government normally controls the schools, too,

although not without the concurrence of the private socio-economic establishments.

In any event, schools and universities are financed or supported by the state, and are bound to operate as socializing agencies that seek to perpetuate the regime, not to challenge it. Not a given political party, of course, but the regime of a given major party system, which is bolstered against any challenges that, as a part of such a defensive ideology, is labelled "extremist". And the function of the schools, apart from training the young in literacy and other skills in demand by employers, public and private, is to socialize youngsters into the established assumptions and loyalties desired in the established social order, by the ruling elite within the generation of elderly males that is predominant in each period.

And by and large the other socializing agencies are fully in line with the school systems in this respect. The mass media, most churches, most business and civic groups, even the best established labor unions, all practice a certain amount of collusion with one another at the top, and none are hospitable to tendencies to challenge existing conservative socialization patterns.

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Yet political education does happen, in our and indeed in every society. Before we can begin to understand revolutions in consciousness, either on the Reichian or the marxist model, we must try to understand the more general dynamics of political education.

If every organization, certainly every large organization, seeks to manipulate and control the individual, so does every new individual seek to protect his authentic feelings and his autonomy. Most individuals have in the past tended to lose out and give up the struggle, many already in the pre-school years or the early grades. They have become socialized to the extent of really behaving as if Mother, Teacher, Parson (or Priest or Rabbi), Gang, or Boss rightfully can be left in charge of one's life. Instead of an autonomous person one becomes an Adolf Eichmann, if the government happens to be fascist; or a Lieutenant William Calley, if the government wages war; or a Chamber of Commerce booster, if this is the role that is in demand. In any event, one becomes one's assigned social role.

Now, I have of course exaggerated. Most of us don't become as fully socialized as William Calley, not even most members of the U.S. or Canadian Army. Most of us find ways of protecting ourselves, at least to some extent. Our chances of success in resisting total socialization depend on a variety of factors, surely, but let us in this context focus on three probable classes of determinants of success in defense of the developing self: neurosis or relative freedom from neurosis; availability of loving, supporting persons; and apparent viability of self-determined ways of life.

Actually, the two first classes of determinants overlap and can best be elaborated on together; for neurosis is normally the outcome of situations in which loving, supporting persons are lacking, especially for the infant and small child with no parents or too uptight

parents to be of much use. A healthy self requires emotional security most of all, to stay healthy; and at a later stage it also requires support and approval, and above all dependable support in times of crisis, when the individual must accept risks in order to protect his independence. The only way to avoid crises of this sort is to avoid growing up, by accepting total socialization (and this is an illusory safety, as Eichmann and Calley both came to realize; and remember that both were quite ordinary men, neither especially stupid nor especially wicked, only men who in their careers had not been in charge of their own lives).

The other class of determinants (or the third, actually, in my list of three) is the apparent viability of self-determined ways of life. In a fiercely competitive "free enterprise" society, with many losers who are deprived of dignity, even sustenance perhaps, it may seem too risky not to shape up and conform.¹⁴ An all-powerful, ideologically intolerant state bureaucracy can be equally intimidating, when it comes to making the point to young people that it is too risky to hold on to the luxury of keeping opinions and feelings of your own.

On this issue, Charles Reich's Greening of America is proof in itself that it has become increasingly possible in North America, at

¹⁴ A "free" magazine provides a nice illustration of the kinds of literature that seek to lure students into a life of well-paid, effective servitude to the economic establishment's purposes: "Good managers have a touch of 'savoir faire' and that's something Jay Merrin wants to build in his training as a management candidate with the Canada Life Assurance Company, Toronto. Jay is 24 and associating regularly, he says, with senior company officials whose knowledge tends to flow his way." -- "If you want to be a successful person, you don't just work from nine to five." Campus, Vol 3. No. 7 (March, 1971), p. 8.

least, to resist total socialization; indeed that it has become possible to reverse the process, in some cases, and assert once again much of the freedom one had given up along the way. Witness the following statements in a review of Reich's book, by an establishment figure, a regular columnist in the Financial Post: After reading this book, writes Alexander Ross, he sat down and wrote Reich "a fan letter -- a long, personal letter telling this man I'd never met what I was doing with my life, how I felt about it, and why I was so thankful he'd written this book . . . The beautiful, liberating thing about this book is that it connects . . . the way a lot of us feel about The System, and the way even more of us feel about ourselves . . ."15

Give the system time, and there will probably be persistent attempts in the media to discredit Reich and his upper-middle class disciples; and yet there is no way to make possible in this context the kind of all-pervasive, continuing symbolic discrediting to which marxism and communism used to be subjected; a massive campaign that in these parts of the world have effectively closed most minds to a vast literature on philosophy, politics and economics, to our loss.

Even academics have tended to fear too close an acquaintance with marxism. But this, too, is in the process of changing; it is almost as if Reich, or the wave on whose crest he rides, has opened a second front of attack against the corporate super-system; his forces alone will not topple it, I suspect, but they will weaken the psychological defenses, even if it should turn out that there is no possibility of developing an alliance with marxist revolutionaries.

¹⁵Financial Post, (Toronto), February 28, 1971.

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Political socialization as a conformity -- inducing, self-stultifying process, while still being respectfully studied by many political scientists, much in the same spirit as they study our electoral rituals, has come under increasing attack also from educators and radical sociologists. Take for instance the following blast from John R. Seeley, aimed specifically at our schools as agencies of socialization: "The school . . . now 'socializes' the child in the worst sense of that word -- meaning that it maneuvers him into conformity of action, belief, even, so far as possible, feeling and character, with whatever happens to be thought appropriate on this score by some segment of his society that happens to be (or appear) in command. Thus he will 'learn', for instance, Emperor - worship, Stalin - worship, or flag-and-pledge worship, depending on where he happens to have been born. This is psychological Eichmannism -- not education."¹⁶

What, then, is education? How can "political education" best be distinguished from "political socialization"? Robert J. Pranger has the term refer to a kind of political communication that "emphasizes above all the artificiality of political order and the citizen as a creative actor within this order"; and he argues that the aim of political education is to produce "the free man armed with enough political sophistication to participate in politics as a person with

¹⁶"Some Problems of In-Service Education of Those in Service in Education." Unpublished paper, mimeo, 1969, p. 19.

the capacity for independent judgment, despite the pressures from political socialization."¹⁷

Pranger sees, as I do, the pressures of political socialization as an obstacle to political education, even though not all the knowledge or all the skills communicated by those processes are counter-educational. I have defined "political education" above as referring "to the processes of setting the individual free, and of giving him the tools of relevant knowledge and of effective articulation, so that he may bring his own autonomously developing perspectives on the worthy purposes of human social life to bear on political issues." (Above, pp. 12-13).

I see an existential contest going on, then, in every social order, between the powerful cohesive pressures from so many centers of power and influence, which aim at imposing habits of thoughtless acceptance and of moral insensitivity on every individual; and on the other side every person's, or at least every young, not-yet-stultified person's, natural efforts to develop his mind in harmony with his own inner needs rather than with the requirements of, say, the Pentagon or the major beneficiaries of the "free enterprise" system.

It may seem an unequal contest, and yet the establishment's problem is that the war can never be conclusively won; with each new child comes a new, potentially free spirit and perhaps a fresh kind of challenge. Moreover, in our period of rapid changes, those in charge of socialization processes are up against increasingly vexing problems

¹⁷Eclipse of Citizenship. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. p. 44.

of glossing over or explaining away absurdities and atrocities on new levels of magnitude, reflecting most basically how an institution - preserving kind of intelligence is more flagrantly unable to face new problems effectively, the faster the world changes. How could it be possible, without unprecedented powers to blunt every last critical impulse, to get yet another generation to accept as the best possible social order a civilization that increasingly resorts to wars of aggression abroad and seems bent on destroying its own cities and their supporting environments as well, rather than commit its vast wealth to socially responsible priorities? "Let them eat cake," said the last Bourbon Empress on the eve of the French revolution. The United States government foreign policies remain at about the same level of vision and sensitivity to the problems of the world's underprivileged, and one can well understand Marshal Lin Piao's sense of confidence in predicting a world-wide revolution ahead of us. He may be right. But it is still possible that a domestic American revolution will come first, not as bloodless as Reich anticipates, but not as cataclysmic, either, as Lin Piao expects.

It would be foolhardy to try to predict the shape of the turbulent events that will bring about some massive, long overdue changes in the United States. But it might help us to identify some of the crucial variables if we consider what the fruits of our time's political education are likely to be, particularly in North America, in terms of the emerging conceptions of and delimitations of "political community".

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"Community" has been preliminarily defined as "any social system in which there is a shared sense of identity with its welfare or, reduced to the simplest criterion, a 'we-feeling' predominating, rather than a 'they-feeling'" (above, p. 11). And "citizenship" has been defined as "politically conscious participation in resolving or seeking to influence the resolution of vital political issues (above, p. 12). In the same context I said that citizenship most generally aims at influencing or replacing those who hold legal powers, in the city or state or the private corporation, but that the term "citizenship" ought to be more broadly defined. It will be remembered that "political issue" has been defined quite broadly, as "any discrepancy between what is and what ought to be, in a community, a society, or the world, in so far as this discrepancy appears reducible by way of appropriate educational and organizational efforts" (above, p. 7).

Increasingly complex civilizations have over the centuries increasingly placed a premium on rational, instrumental thinking as compared to institutional, traditional ways of thinking. This has been called a development from status to contract, or from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Complex systems of rational thought integrated with human experience have been accumulating, indeed with rapidly accelerating velocity in the last decades in particular, and have been sorted out and stored in the various conventional categories of scientific knowledge, categories which to be sure are reshuffled from time to time, according to the requirements of changing purposes. All this instrumental knowledge,

or much of it anyway, is of course of great benefit to mankind, and has made it possible to multiply and fill up much of the earth's empty spaces, or spaces previously occupied by lesser breeds, and indeed the chosen minorities among us have been allowed lives of unprecedented comforts and of academically trained intellects as well.

But scientific knowledge is not the same as wisdom; neither is comfort the same as happiness, or a person with a trained intellect the same as an educated person. We have had to pay a high price for our rationality, our knowledge, our comforts, and our schools with their training programs, I believe. The price is in part in terms of a loss of community and an eclipse of meaningful citizenship. The silver lining that I see -- in common, I think, with Marx as well as with Reich -- is the possibility of holding on to our scientific knowledge and most of the technology that is based on it, and to expand our comforts to those who are now deprived, and yet at the same time to go to work to rebuild communities, -- more human^e and civilized communities. It will take at least a partial revolution of consciousness to move firmly in that direction, but I believe this mental revolution is in the works, -- above all in our school systems, faster-changing than ever before, yet subjected to more radical challenges than ever before, even challenges to their very existence.¹⁸

Out of this struggle within our school systems we have seen fragile but nonetheless real communities develop, -- of small peer groups, with shared visions and sometimes shared enemies too. For

¹⁸ See especially Ivan Illich. Deschooling Society. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

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¹⁹Michael V. Miller. "The Student State of Mind," in Miller and Susan Gilmore (eds.). Revolution at Berkeley. New York: Dell, Laurel edition paperback, 1965, p. 61 and pp. 53-61. --See also Sheldon Wolin and John Schaar, writing in New York Review of Books, February 9, 1967, ("The University Revolution"): "While the (Berkeley) campus Administration intones the language of community, it is the students who have been building community among themselves. Although there are student leaders, there is no permanent clique which can manipulate the students . . . If the Administration tries to destroy this community by chopping off its head, it may find itself battling a Hydra." This essay is reprinted in The Berkeley Rebellion and Beyond. New York: Vintage, 1970; see p. 59.

example, anyone over 30; or "the establishment". A sense of unprecedented solidarity and comradeship among students developed as a by-product of many campus confrontations, -- first of all, perhaps, in Berkeley^e in the days of the Free Speech Movement. In the words of one participant-observer:

"Everyone speaks of an authentic, campus-wide feeling of community in the air, of professors and students greeting each other by first names: of innumerable plans cropping up to give students more control over course content and professors over student discipline; of traditional divisions between campus cliques -- bohemians, "dormies", even fraternity and sorority types -- having been bridged. Will this state of affairs endure? Or are the victors only basking in the warm afterglow of revolutionary solidarity?"¹⁹

Such kinds of student communities, in my sense of "community", have come and gone, with victories and defeats, advances and retreats in the struggle for student self-expression and student power. In Berkeley as elsewhere, small armies of administration bureaucrats in charge of student relations have been able to whittle down student victories achieved or to explain them away to subsequent generations of students. And administrators have been in a better position than students to stand united, with hierarchy-imposed discipline and equipped

¹⁹ Michael V. Miller. "The Student State of Mind," in Miller and Susan Gilmore (eds.). Revolution at Berkeley. New York: Dell, Laurel edition paperback, p. 61 and pp. 53-61. See also Sheldon Wolin and John Schaar, "The Berkeley Crisis," in New York Review of Books, March 11, 1965, pp. 18-24: While the Berkeley campus administration "intones the language of community, it is the students who have been building community among themselves. Although there are student leaders, there is no permanent clique which can manipulate the students . . . if the Administration tries to destroy this community by chopping off its head, it may find itself battling a Hydra." (p. 21). -- This passage is left out in the same authors' volume of reprinted essays: The Berkeley Rebellion and Beyond. New York: Vintage, 1970.

with data toward improved strategies for each new confrontation. As a result the more sensitive, incorruptible students have increasingly sought escapes in the drug culture, or else have established more or less "countercultural" communities on the fringes of academic communities such as Berkeley's, or out in the country. Only relatively few stalwarts have remained to continue the struggle for community inside the universities. In the last couple of years they have been up against the additional handicap of a widespread belief that future job prospects for most academics are poor; a much too pessimistic forecast, I believe, in spite of the present glut on the job market,²⁰ but a useful attitude to cultivate for the administrators of our universities. It helps to keep the minds of students off political ideals and sentiments of solidarity with the oppressed.

Genuine student communities will come and go, but will perhaps come more quickly and last longer, generally speaking, if Charles Reich's impression of an increasing incidence of liberation from Consciousness I and Consciousness II is valid. I think it is, but unlike Reich I believe that not the countercultural so much as the explicitly political communities of students within the universities will be the main change agents, who will also carry with them, gradually, into offices and factories and neighborhoods the aspirations to community, and the kinds of stubbornly honest citizenship behavior that first

²⁰With increasing numbers of Americans returning from military to civilian occupations, and with increasing technological unemployment in prospect, I believe the authorities are bound to enlarge educational or training institutions, if only to keep additional millions off the streets.

received national exposure in the Berkeley struggles of 1964/65. In Tom Hayden's words, "communities come and go, existing at their best during intense periods of solidarity. But even where they fail to achieve institutional reality, these communities become a permanent part of this generation's consciousness of the possible." And he adds, optimistically: "The new society will take shape in the womb of the old."²¹

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Communities have to grow from the ground up. If they are imposed from the top, and continually promoted, as states normally are, then what we have are pseudo-communities, fortified by artificial props like flags and anthems, monarchies and military heroes. States are instruments of ruling elites and privileged classes, and the nationalist sentiments that support them are artifacts of political socialization, not the natural expression of solidarity between people who relate to one another as human beings. Worst of all, nationalist sentiments normally crave enemies, in any event those who want large military expenditures do, with the result that nearly every brand of nationalism, the Canadian one certainly included, becomes an obstacle to the growth of we-feelings with all of mankind, or international solidarity. Genuine local communities can cultivate international brotherhood;

²¹ See his "Welfare Liberalism and Social Change." Dissent, January-February, 1966. Quoted in Alan Wolfe. "Conditions of Community: The Case of Old Westbury College," in Philip Green and Sanford Levinson (eds.) Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science. New York: Vintage, 1970, p. 216.

for revolts whose results will stick, are substantial. We may well have passed a watershed when we come to the time when even one single, reputable university has achieved representative government, based on equality and community between students and faculty. From then on other universities, and subsequently other local neighborhoods, will know that local communities with genuinely participatory democracy are possible to achieve.

In the meantime another hopeful development is already taking place: there is an increasing awareness of the fact that our cities have become much more important to most of us in our daily lives, compared to the states that we also inhabit. In Robert Dahl's words,

"... it is in the city and with the powers and resources made available to cities that we shall deal with such crucial problems as the education of our children, our housing, the way we travel to and from our place of work, preventive health measures, crime, public order, the cycle of poverty, racial justice and equality -- not to mention all those subtle and little understood elements that contribute so heavily to the satisfaction of our desires for friendship, neighborhood, community and beauty."²²

Small and moderate-sized cities, or local neighborhoods within cities can, unlike all but the smallest of states, some day come to approximate democratic systems of government, if academic communities lead the way; and the struggle to achieve this end can release great new energies of citizenship and political consciousness. The fact that

²²"The City in the Future of Democracy." American Political Science Review. Vol. 61 (1967), p. 965 and pp. 954-70.

powerful symbols of patriotism remain vested in the authorities of the states will make the struggle to fragment them and decentralize their powers more demanding, but also more rewarding in terms of the stimulation of a consciousness radically liberated from the old symbols.

There are strong pressures even today, even within our present political system, for fuller city controls over resources. Most cities in North America are in desperate straits, although their deterioration appears to have gone further in the States than in Canada. The pendulum has swung so far that we are bound to see a reverse trend soon, toward increasing fiscal resources for the cities; they will either fall apart or obtain the resources for recovery and rejuvenation. In Sweden, perhaps the most advanced non-socialist state ("capitalism with a human face?"), recent years have seen the sprouting of healthy new byarlag, or activist neighborhood associations, militant to the point of collective civil disobedience, in the major cities, in defense of their local communities. It is the nearest thing to activist student communities in North America except that it cuts across the generations.

Meaningful citizenship on a national arena is not impossible, as Ralph Nader's example proves, but is exceedingly rare, unless much more limited communities provide one's real constituencies, -- say, Indian or black communities, students, or the poor. Many student activists, and also professional organizers like Saul Alinsky, have been active in support of the growth of local communities to be unified in struggles against exploiting interests; the issues most real in such neighborhood^s are the local ones, not the national or international ones,

as Alinsky has kept arguing.

Citizenship becomes more feasible, I conclude, the more our states, and especially our large states, tend to break up or become decentralized, with increasing powers ceded to our cities and provinces, in Canada and elsewhere. Let us by all means welcome a Free Quebec, for these reasons, too; but why not also a Free Calgary? Provided, of course, that we find ways to cooperate politically in clipping the wings of the vastly centralized corporate power structures, which are already enjoying far more freedom from political control than is compatible with the preservation of human life on this planet.

To the extent that Charles Reich's predictions are valid, and I believe he is vastly exaggerating but yet is onto something very real, prospects for fragmentation are good in North America. This would bode well for the rest of the world as well, since the United States military forces and financial control now constitute the crucial bulwark in the defense of the "Free World", i.e., the bulwark that protects the whole monstrous system of oppressive regimes and exploiting supra-national corporations against the potential wrath of ordinary people everywhere.

To much of the world's population the marxists have come up with the only really viable challenge to the traditional religious and political symbols that have kept the peoples down, which is why our own media have hated marxists and communists so much and have tried to vaccinate all of us against their doctrines. I believe our immunity is wearing off, although most of our white middle class young

people will continue to prefer Reich's kind of appeal to the various marxist appeals.

Outside North America, and especially in the poorer countries, the appeals of marxism appear on the increase. Between Moscow's and Peking's brands of marxism I believe there is little doubt but that Peking now represents the forces that are fast gaining in strength. Although I welcome this development because it will give hope to the most badly oppressed in the world, who are most in need of hope (and such hopes are more realistic than hopes for salvation in the next life), it does not follow that I ought to become a Maoist. As a political scientist concerned with problems of human survival first of all, and then with human rights, I see my own major commitment not in working for the marxist world revolution, which will come when the time is ripe for it, but in contributing to the task of making the Greening of the World possible without scorching it first.

This is, to me, the most urgent challenge to political education in one time. This requires a conception of citizenship inspired by a sense of the community of mankind as a whole, including the unborn; and at the same time, in our daily struggles, oriented toward our local communities. These must become real, so that we may acquire a political consciousness, and learn to resist the symbols of domination in behalf of pseudo-communities of national or corporate or supranational scope.

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