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THE ONTARIO INSTITUTE FOR STUDIES IN EDUCATION

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DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY

April 3, 1973.

Mr. Lanny Beckman,
Mental Patients Association,
Vancouver, B. C.

Dear Mr. Beckman:

I am writing in reference to your research report: The hip adolescent, his family, and the generation gap, which you produced for the Committee on Youth Report. I found it quite a thorough study and use it for a course that I am teaching at The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. The pattern of results that you obtained with the OPI is almost identical to those that I obtained with my thesis on student politics at the University of Toronto (The student movement of the '60s). In your study you refer to a scale that measures hipness. Would you be kind enough to send me a copy of it? I would be interested in using it in my own research.

Thank you for your trouble.

Yours sincerely,

Jack Quarter

Jack Quarter.

JQ/jk

Shifting Ideologies Among Youth in Canada

Jack Quarter

The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

In 1971 a Government-sponsored Commission on Youth titled It's Your Turn...stated as follows.

> "Young people in Canada show every indication of joining the great refusal taking place throughout the world. Their confidence in the existing order is being undermined on two fronts; not only are they forced intellectually to challenge many of the values inherent in our society, but also the traditional motives or incentives for participation in the "system" are increasingly unavailable. This refusal which ranges all the way from disenchantment to rejection, is manifest in many ways -- the growing absenteeism in high schools, the decline in university enrolment (relative to predictions), the demand for storefront or street services and, especially, the marked increase in drug use among all classes of young people." (Hunter, Bourdon & Kelly, 1971, p.4)

The Committee on Youth Report has employed Herbert Marcuse's label of "the great refusal" to describe the outlook of many diverse subgroupings -- including youth who have moved to rural communes, those living in urban enclaves, a drug culture, political activists, and perhaps a majority who keep one foot in the door and another outside. In some cases the differences between these groups are greater than the similarities. Moreover, the various subcultures are not the exclusive domain of youth (in a chronological sense) because some adults identify with the sentiment that is being expressed.

If there is a unifying strain among these diverse groups it is a lack of commitment to the values needed to assume stable roles in institutions like the corporation, school, family, and government. In some cases the lack of commitment may be derived from a counter-commitment that leads to a concerted opposition to social conventions; in other cases it may not involve a firm counter-commitment or opposition, but merely a period of experimentation, observing, and deciding. Among this latter group there is probably even lack of commitment to fundamental social change.

This pattern of conventional commitment withholding in industrially developed societies has been described by Kenneth Keniston (1970) as a new stage in life called "youth". Although Keniston's description of youth seems to restrict its membership to a narrower group than is referred to by the Committee on Youth Report, there is much overlap between the two groups. In contrast to "adolescence", Keniston points out that youth are biologically and socially prepared to assume positions of responsibility, but they withhold a commitment because they cannot reconcile the expectations involved in conventional social roles with their own values.

Perhaps more than any other writer, Keniston has captured the spirit of the youth experience in industrialized societies; but by referring to the desire for an "indefinite prolongation of the nonadult state" as a stage in life, he seems to reduce the social significance of the phenomena. A stage of life concept (e.g., infancy or adolescence) implies that biological factors are of considerable importance in its development, and that biological factors will in turn contribute to growing out of the stage. Although this may be true in small degree for "youth", the fact that only a minority of those at

the age of youth attempt to withhold a commitment to adulthood would suggest that youth is less a developmental phenomena than an orientation that is primarily induced by social relationships in industrially advanced societies. Desiring to prolong the nonadult state is important because it is a reaction to existing social relationships. The fact that it is most likely to occur in the twenties and late teens is less a consequence of biological factors operating at those ages than the position of those age groups in the social order. Because youth have not had to make a commitment, psychologically they are in more of a position to withhold themselves than adults who have already committed themselves to conventional orientations. Otherwise there is no conceivable reason why a twenty-year old is more likely than a forty-year old to withhold a commitment to conventional social roles.

However, the very fact that a significant and growing proportion of young people do not identify with conventional orientations and are a part of the great refusal, is of social significance because stability rests upon commitment to a common set of goals. Without a common commitment it is not possible for a society to maintain its institutional structure.

It is true that in industrially advanced societies -- there are many subcultural variations -- of a dominant goal orientation. The way of life in the workingclass is different from the middleclass, as is the way of life between Irish, French, or Jewish ethnic groups, or the way of life between males and females. Depending upon the definition of subculture, and the fineness of the classification system, there are many important cultural variations within societies. However, there is a basic difference between subcultures as it has been traditionally

defined, and the pattern of commitment withdrawal developing among youth.* Although subcultures have their unique way of life and separate institutions, there also is commitment to fundamental social goals -- even if it is something as general as the importance of economic growth. Among the young people described in the Committee on Youth Report, this commitment is very much in doubt. There is refusal to participate as expected in the corporation, school, family, and for that matter all institutions that are tainted by conventionality. Yet this withdrawal has not led to a unique culture, because youth still are very dependent upon the most basic institution in society -- the economy -- to have access to goods and services.

Only youth on rural communes with a self-sufficient economy may be considered as having formed a unique society. However, the short duration of the vast majority of rural communes testifies to the problem in establishing a viable colony on an 'island in a stormy sea'. Reminders of a world left behind are plentiful, and years of character formation leave a residue in the psyche that cannot be extirpated very easily.

For youth who remain within the mainstream of society and depend upon the economy or support institutions like the school, any claim to a unique way of life is very weak. At most they can state their ideals and goals, express their opposition, and compartmentalize a degree of uniqueness in dress, speech, and manners while manifesting relatively conventional behaviors. To deal with the conflict of nonidentification with conventional institutions

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* Yinger (1960), distinguishes between subculture and contraculture. I find contraculture an inappropriate concept because many youth who are withholding a commitment are not a part of oppositional subcultures.

but no viable alternatives, youth have developed a pattern of noncommitment referred to by the Committee on Youth Report.

The Committee on Youth Report has been severely criticized by Government officials as representing the views of only a small segment of youth; and on the surface this criticism seems quite valid. The Report does not include the conformist youth that social critics like Edgar Friedenberg and Paul Goodman have lamented about, and the many conventional subcultures among youth. Yet as valid as the criticism of the Committee on Youth Report is, there is a fallacy in weighing the importance of a social phenomena by the numbers it represents at a given point in time. Such reasoning is reminiscent of the statestician that drowned in the river that was two feet deep — on the average.

A study conducted among university students in Chile in 1964 points out the limitations of equating the proportions holding a given outlook at one point in time with the importance of that outlook (Glazer, 1968). The study indicated that the Marxist coalition of Salvador Allende had the support of only 22% of university students in Chile in 1964, and 23% were opposed to them being allowed to take office if they were legally elected, and another 15% were undecided on the matter. The author described Chilean students as having "center-left" tendencies — that is, feeling that there should be fundamental reforms, not revolutionary change. Glazer's survey appeared to be technically sound, and would have led one to believe that a Marxist revolution in Chile would not be very imminent. The numerical strength of the Communist Party was relatively weak among the most militant segment of the Chilean population. Yet six years after Glazer's survey

was taken, Chile elected a Marxist government under the leadership of Salvadore Allende, and a program of revolutionary change was being implemented. The problem with Glazer's study is not its technical competence, but rather the overall method of examining and interpreting attitudes apart from a dynamic theory. The numerical strength of a given outlook has to be considered in relation to the social forces that are stimulating it. Although Canada and Chile are at different stages of industrial development, and the politics in the two countries are very different, a lesson can be drawn from Glazer's study that might be taken into consideration in analyzing the great refusal. It is important to know whether this phenomena represents a minor but flamboyant social irritant that is receiving more attention than it deserves, or whether the combination of forces which are stimulating it are likely to grow, and as such we are witnessing the initial stages of a more profound social transformation.

II

To examine the phenomena of noncommitment among youth it seems necessary to set out a dynamic conceptual framework through which it is possible to view the relationship between ideas (ideology) and social organization. In this regard, we assume as did Max Weber, that social organization requires an appropriate motivational pattern to stimulate its development and to sustain its stability (Weber, 1930). Although Weber's critique of Marxist materialism came forward as one-sided idealism, his argument that the ideology in a society is an independent, active social force, and not just a reflection of the organization of production, provides

a basis for social analysis. As Tawney rightly suggests in his critique of Weber, the ideology and the socio-economic organization should be viewed as interdependent forces, both of which evolve from independent influences and both of which interact with and stimulate each other (Tawney, 1963). The material conditions in a society (technology, resources) make certain types of ideas more probable than others, however, the ideas that evolve have much to do with the previous cultural influences, and these ideas in turn influence the socio-economic development.

Whether the ideology of a society represents the interests of one class over another is really of less consequence than the fact that for there to be stability the inhabitants have to believe in the way of life and be motivated to participate. Punitive restraints or coercive rewards enacted in the interests of a dominant class, as is the case in all class-societies, cannot be more than a temporary basis for stability if the ideology does not have meaning for the people.

Weber contended that the values of the Protestant Reformation were necessary for capitalism to supplant feudal social organization. People had to believe that their worth in the eyes of God would be measured by their standing on Earth. It was through hard labour, individual initiative leading to the conquest of nature, self-denial and planning for the future that the individual could best be successful. The workingclass had to perceive work as an end in itself, and had to experience guilt for excessive leisure. The bourgeoise, for their part, required an ideology that would allow them to exploit the labour of the workingclass as well as natural

resources, and to have a clear conscience in doing so. The values of the Protestant Reformation was the motor that the machines of industrial development required.

Once this ideology was internalized then production could become the goal of human labour, and the economy could be organized in accordance with that goal. Although the readiness of the material conditions may have made the Protestant Reformation or a similar ideology very probable, the Protestant Reformation in turn allowed industrialization to take off.

The point is that it is impossible to have an industrially advanced society with a pre-industrial motivational pattern, and similarly a pre-industrial society with the motivational pattern of an industrialized society. Wilfred Pelletier's vivid description of the Indian people's value system, and the difficulties they have in adjusting to industrialized settings is an apt illustration of the point (Pelletier, 1971). Pelletier describes the experience of Indians working at a saw mill at Longlac, Ontario, who were absent and late quite frequently, and much to the annoyance of their manager, did not meet the production quota of the Company. On the advice of a Community Development Officer, the manager of the plant allowed the Indians to organize their own production team on a communal basis that was more compatible with the Indian way of life rather than the highly specialized assembly-line that the Company used. The Indians worked very efficiently and completed their quota before the hunting season, and then took off to

enjoy themselves. The next year, the manager, who was operating off of a different motivational pattern, increased the Indian's work quota by 50%. As a result the Indians rebelled and refused to cooperate.

The example cited by Pelletier is an apt illustration of the motivational differences between pre-industrial and industrialized societies. For the Indians work was a social function that was performed in order to produce things that were needed (or to earn the wages to purchase necessary goods). Working in a factory was in and of itself a compromise with the Indian way of life, but the workers seemed able to make the adjustment, provided that they could take some of their values with them. For the manager work was part of a neverending process -- an end in itself. He worked to produce a surplus that the owners could reinvest in order to expand production. This form of "rational" economic action, or what Max Weber called the Protestant ethic, was the motivational pattern that capitalism required.

As industrialization has proceeded, and ideology has moved from religious into scientific garments, much of the work in the social sciences has been devoted to revamping the values of the Protestant Reformation into an appropriate secular variant. Social scientists who have experienced the process of industrialization and for the most part believed it is a worthwhile process, have set out objective standards to assess phenomena as well as a suitable scientific rationale. Achievement, the secular version of the Reformation, has become the pivotal aspect of the culture. The rhetoric is secular rather than religious, and the exponents are social scientists rather than clergy, however, both sets of ideas are designed for explaining "the social system" and motivating adjustment-type behaviors.

Perhaps the most direct effort to make the connection between the Protestant Reformation and achievement comes from the work of David McClelland (1967). In a monumental study of countries throughout the world, McClelland found that the values of self-reliance, that were a part of the Reformation, led parents to employ independence and mastery training in rearing their children, and this in turn led the children to being disposed to achieving standards of excellence. McClelland's thesis runs parallel to the theorizing of Talcott Parsons and the functional sociologists (Parsons, 1951, 1959; Shils & Parsons, 1962). These theorists contend that social equilibrium can best be maintained by having highly differentiated social roles of varying degrees of intrinsic interest and extrinsic value, and having the individual assigned to these roles according to their achievements, rather than ascribed characteristics such as class, father's occupation, /sex, ethnic group. Through institutions like the family, school, and peer group, children are socialized to excell at whatever they attempt. On the Judgement Day achievement is assessed and avenues are opened or closed according to the merit of the applicant.

The ideology of achievement and the various interrelated ideas have provided the perfect stimulus for industrial development. An industrialized society requires a highly mobile labour force that would save, plan, and live for the future, while suppressing the impeding emotional commitments that are part of the present. As such, rationality has been equated with "affective neutrality", or what social critics refer to as alienation, and emotion which has disappeared from social interaction, has virtually dropped out of the language of behaviorist psychology. The ideology of achivement

is in fundamental conflict with maverick ideologies that are less compatible with the needs of an industrial society, and it is through the social sciences that the efficacy of these other ideas have been undermined. The experiental psychologies of Freudianism and existential-humanism and the social thought of Marx have received the ultimate criticism of being nonscientific and nonobjective, and along with human nature, have been banished to the unconscious forever. In the achieving societies the rational man is one who can anticipate and maximize rewards without impeding "emotional hangups".

If it can be accepted that achievement provides the ideological foundation of modern capitalism, and that social stability depends upon belief in this ideology, the question which has to be asked is whether the great refusal does represent a fundamental shift away from this ideology? Without a systematic investigation one can only speculate about the answer to this question. Nevertheless, the durability of phenomena and its international character would seem to justify a discussion of the available evidence.

In this paper I would like to set out two general hypotheses, and to present evidence to justify a more rigorous test of these hypotheses. a) The achievement orientation is weakening among youth, and b) the weakening of the achievement orientation is being stimulated by the very process of industrial development that ironically depends upon the achievement orientation. In other words, with increasing industrial development the orientation to achieve is becoming an obsolete motivational pattern.

Let us examine each of these hypotheses in turn.

a) The Achievement Ethic is Weakening

There seems little need to say that achievement is not a part of the "hippie" motivation pattern (Wolfe, 1968; Hopkins, 1968; Yablonsky, 1968; & Westhues, 1972). In many respects, hippies, especially those who have gravitated to rural communes, have established a pre-industrial way of life. The spiritual value system emphasizes living in harmony with nature rather than conquering it; living in the present rather than the future, and cooperation rather than individualism. Among the many strains in the youth culture, hippies living on rural communes might be considered as the only group who have formed a unique society.

We are more concerned with youth who remain and live within the mainstream of society, but who are withholding a commitment to conventional institutions, either because they oppose the conventional goals and are committed to or searching for alternatives, or because they are questioning the goals and experimenting with alternative lifestyles. They are similar to "countercultural youth" who have moved to rural communes only insofar as neither group identifies with and are willing to commit themselves to conventional institutions. However, youth who remain within the mainstream of the dominant society have to grapple with the dissonance between their ideas and the available institutional outlets. To deal with this dissonance, a pattern on noncommital behavior is developing.

This point is illustrated by a survey the author conducted among a random sample of 218 Arts and Science students at the University of Toronto in the Spring of 1972. The survey shows that 39.9% of students were

totally undecided about a career, whereas 6.4% had decided about a field but not a specific career, whereas 1.4% did not respond. The proportions of totally undecided was relatively equal among males and females (41.8% males and 38.0% females). But more important, the proportions did not change appreciably over the years. Among first year students the percentage of totally undecided was 44.2%, In second year the percentage was 34.5%, and in the third and final year the percentage was 44.4%.* The percentage of undecided in the last year was almost identical to first year.

More revealing than the proportions of undecided students were the reasons for indecision. Approximately two-thirds made remarks like; "can't say", "nothing is appealing", or described the available options in derisive, cynical, and nondescript terms. Indecision was less for practical reasons than for a sense of profound dissatisfaction with the available opportunities.

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* A small number of students in fourth year Honour Arts & Science Courses also were in the sample, but the numbers in this group were too small to be representative of fourth year students. 32.1% of students in fourth year were undecided about a career. When this number is combined with students in third year to obtain a picture of last-year students, the percentage of undecided is 40.4%.

This survey to measure the extensiveness of career indecision was stimulated by the authors' thesis research, and a longitudinal study that was a followup to the thesis (Quarter, 1972). The thesis involved a study of student politics among a voluntear sample of 248 male incoming students at the University of Toronto.* It indicated that there was a disproportionately large number of politically left-wing students among those who were undecided about a career. Political attitudes were assessed by a series of scales examining issues inside and outside of the university (Quarter, 1972). The magnitude of the relationship between political attitudes and career indecision was quite strong with F-ratio ranging from 11 to 26.** Moreover, a three-year followup indicated that the undecided students had been radicalized relative to career-committed students during their university years.

A more thorough investigation of the characteristics distinguishing undecided students was also very revealing.*** On Kohlberg's moral

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* The proportion of undecided students among the voluntear sample was 29.3%, which is somewhat smaller than the random sample previously referred to. However, this group included professional as well as Arts & Science students. Three years later a followup survey of 186 of the original sample indicated that 26.9% of the sample were undecided. Although there was much shifting about as to who was undecided, the proportions remained relatively constant. In addition, the proportion of students who were decided about a field, but not a specific career, increased significantly over the three years. In first year it was 9.7%, whereas in third year it was 18.9%.

** The weakest F-ratio had a $p<.001$.

*** All the differences reported in the paper are significant at the .05 level and most of the differences are at the .01 level.

dilemmas, the undecided students expressed more principled responses relative to the career-committed -- the largest proportion of whom were very conventionally oriented. Many of the scales on the Omnibus Personality differentiated the two groups of students. Undecided students were much more esthetic than the career oriented. They had a stronger appreciation of art, literature, music, paintings, and sculpture than the latter. Another OPI scale which differentiated undecided from the career-oriented and that tapped characteristics similar to estheticism was the Masculinity-Femininity scale. The career-committed students were more interested in hard subjects like chemistry, physics, and mathematics; whereas the undecided students were inclined toward the soft esthetic subjects. Supportive of this result is the fact that a disproportionately high number of undecided students studied the humanities and social sciences as opposed to business, professions, and physical sciences.

A series of OPI scales that measured authoritarianism -- Complexity, Autonomy, and Practical Orientation -- also differentiated the two groups. The undecided Ss expressed a higher tolerance for ambiguity, a desire for freedom and independence from judgemental authoritarian thinking, and a preference for ideas and the mysterious, as opposed to facts and the concrete. This anti-authoritarian humanistic strain expressed by undecided students, also has been found among other youth groups. It has been discovered among student activists (Heist, 1965, 1966; Flacks, 1967; Keniston, 1968; Hampden-Turner, 1970; and Quarter 1972), among youth working out alternative cultural options (Keniston, 1969; Roszak, 1969; Beckman, 1970; Reich, 1971), and very

prominently in popular musical lyrics (Carey, 1969; Harmon, 1972). Like the desire for political and cultural change, the search for career alternatives seem to be hinged to a changing motivational orientation.

Surprisingly, the Religious Orientation scale of the OPI did not reveal a significant difference between undecided and career committed students, but undecided students did express greater nonreligious identity. 61.4% of the undecided classified themselves as being atheist, agnostic, or belonging to a nonsectarian religion, whereas only 39.9% of the career-committed fall within these categories. The nonreligious feelings among the undecided would seem to be another expression of changing value orientation.

Another set of characteristics that differentiated undecided youth apart from the career committed were personal adjustment and self-satisfaction. Responses to the Personal Integration, Anxiety Level, Response Bias, and Social Extraversion Scale of the OPI indicated that undecided students experienced more guilt, unhappiness, higher anxiety, and were more socially withdrawn. In addition, their response to a seven-point scale indicated greater dissatisfaction with school. These feelings may be viewed as the by-products of motivational change that comes from a dissatisfaction with society, but with no viable alternatives as outlets for changing orientations. Other data that indicate the adjustment difficulties among youth, are marked increase in suicides, alcoholism, drug addiction, and admissions to hospitals for mental illness in the younger age groups (Quarter, 1973). Undecided youth are not manifesting such extreme dissatis-

faction, but their professed anxiety and guilt relative to the career-committed seem to be symptoms of a similar reaction to society.

The distinctive pattern of characteristics manifest by undecided students would seem to indicate that career indecision reflects a unique orientation to life. In a sense, the indecision may be viewed as a defensive posture needed until changing ideologies have institutional outlets.

A similar reaction on the part of youth is illustrated in a study of scholastic performance of grades 11-13 students in a suburban Vancouver high school (Beckman, 1970). Beckman divided his sample into two groups, "hip" and "nonhip", and then followed their scholastic performance from grade 1 through high school. The "hip" students displayed superior performance to the "nonhips" throughout elementary school, but at the start of high school there was a sharp reversal. Grades among the "hip" students dropped off markedly while grades among "nonhips" remained relatively constant. This pattern occurred in spite of the fact that the "hip" students had higher intelligence quotients, and showed a stronger intellectual disposition on the Omnibus Personality Inventory than the "nonhips". Beckman concluded that: "The failure of the educational system to involve the interests of these intelligent and questioning young people is a point which is both disturbing and worthy of consideration at all levels of educational policy-making". (p. 47).

In addition to declining academic performance, Beckman discovered that over 60% of the "hip" students, as opposed to 25% of the "nonhip" students, were undecided about their future careers. Interestingly, the pattern of

characteristics manifested by Beckman's hip students on the OPI is strikingly similar to the undecided university students in my own research.

In addition to career indecision, and declining academic performance among hip youth, the university dropout phenomena was another indication of changing orientations. The trend toward declining enrolment in university, relative to predictions and available space, became apparent in 1970-71 when the enrolment increase was only 6.5% as compared to 12 to 15% throughout the 1960's (Forland, 1972).* Since the 1970-71 academic year there has been a continuing decline in the rate of enrolment increase, with universities showing an increment of 2.3% in 1971-72, and an estimated .5% in 1972-73.** This unexpected low enrolment has plunged some universities into a financial crisis, because the funds that they receive is tied to the size of their student body. The Statistics Canada Study by Forling (1972) estimates that in 1971-72 7.7% of students who were accepted at university did not attend any university, and in addition, substantial numbers who had attended in 1970-71 did not return in 1971-72.This has led Statistics Canada to commission a demographic study of this new type of "dropout" phenomena which would include "the reasons for withdrawing", and other characteristics.

Although the decline in the rate of enrolment increases has coincided with an increasing unemployment rate, and it is likely that the

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* These data are cited in Forland, Y., Student withdrawals from Canadian Universities. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Education Division - Service Bulletin, 1972. This report points out that a similar trend was underway in the United States, where in 1971 the increase in first year students was only 0.7%.

** The information about enrolments for 1972-73 was given to me by Dr.Miles Weisenthal, the Director of the Education Division of Statistics Canada. His figures still are preliminary, but he is quite certain the .5% estimate is very close to the final figure.

weakening of the economy has played a primary role in this trend, it would be difficult to argue that economic factors are the only reason for this phenomena. In surveying the various regions in Canada, Quebec, which has a relatively high unemployment rate, had a relatively low percentage of dropouts (3%), whereas the Prairies, with a relatively low unemployment rate, had a high percentage of dropouts. Universities in Western Canada were showing a decline in enrolment as early as 1970-71 (Ferting, 1972). In addition to economic considerations, the decisions by students not to go directly to university from high school, and the decision to drop out of university also appears to involve a questioning of values.

This questioning of values also can be found in the changing orientations toward work. Money and status, the traditional job incentives, no longer seem sufficient reasons to perform a job.

Youth are searching for ways of life that provide modes of self-expression rather than making sacrifices for extrinsic rewards. There is a reaction against the technological imperative that reduces jobs to insipid components, ignoring the potential for intrinsic job satisfaction. The reorientation to work among youth can be found in projects submitted for Opportunities for Youth Grants. The program was set up by the Government of Canada during the Summer of 1971 in response to the unusually high unemployment among youth. With unemployment throughout the Labour Force running between 6 and 7%, and unemployment in the 14-24 age group at approximately double that level, the Government became concerned at the social and political consequences of high unemployment among 1,800,000 students coming into the

Labour Force. As such, the Government set aside $57.2 million to employ students. Applicants had to submit proposals for jobs, and they were rated and funded according to priority categories set by officials. 38.3% of the project applications fell into the social service area and involved activities such as community enrichment, referral agencies, education, pollution clean-up, drop-in centres, legal-medical aid, rehabilitation counseling and day care centres. 36.6% of the applications involved research in environmental problems, sociology, community service, historical and ethnic; 15.0% were recreation projects; and 10.1% involved cultural activities such as theatre, photography, music, crafts, and others.

Although the nature of the submissions were undoubtedly influenced by the fact that one criterion for funding was that the project must involve meaningful work, the instant popularity of the program, and the decision to renew it in 1972 testifies the changing work orientation among youth. Approximately four times as many proposals were submitted as were funded; and the applicants seemed to emphasize community, service, and expressive types of activities. The programs provided the opportunity for students to offer services without the constraint of profit or success, and evaluation of the outcome proved quite satisfactory (Cohen et al, 1972).

Similar and stronger evidence of the changing vocational orientations among youth comes from the United States. In a fifteen year study of medical students at Harvard University between 1958 and 1972, three primary areas in career selection were discovered (Funkenstein 1972). In the 1950's up until 1959, the primary orientation was toward specialized private practice. In 1959 there was a shift toward graduating doctors who would do academic research, with part-

time teaching and part-time patient care. There was an emphasis on obtaining a strong grounding in basic science and research, and pre-medical humanities and social sciences courses dropped out of the curriculum. Funkenstein suggests that the Scientific Era was stimulated by the cold war competition between the United States and Russia, that made funds available for basic research, as well as important scientific discoveries such as DNA and poliomyelitis vaccine.

Then, in the late 1960's a new era was ushered in. Many medical students were distressed by the failure of the conventional medical system to deliver the service properly, and to prevent illness. In this present Community Era, there is an emphasis on making sure that all segments of the population have basic coverage without regard to cost. Students began studying the social sciences and choosing careers in public health and family medicine, in spite of the resistance of the "Medical Establishment" to sanctioning this trend. Interestingly enough, the onset of the Community Era in medicine is paralleled by the spread of the great refusal; the values implied by the shift to community service seem to express a shift away from the motivation of the entrepreneur and academic achievement, toward providing the service in the most humane way possible.

A similar emphasis seemed to emerge in the projects funded through Opportunities for Youth Grants by the Canadian government. Students in professions such as law, dentistry, and medicine sought to integrate their service into the community and make it readily available to the people.

Daniel Yankelovich's study of values among university students throughout the United States also provides further evidence of changing orientations toward career and work (Yankelovich, 1972). Yankelovich examined the values of the two groups of college students: career-minded and post-affluent. The latter group were more typical of youth withholding a commitment, although not necessarily so. Some of the statements that differentiate the two groups are an interesting reflection of value orientations.

	% Agreement	
	Career Minded	Post-Affluent
Competition encourages excellence	71	48
Sacredness of private property	79	55
Factors important in a career choice		
Self-expression	56	75
Job security	56	29
Chance to get ahead	45	19
Money	54	29
Prestige	26	14

Again, these items seem to indicate a shift away from the achievement orientation.

The research evidence discussed in this paper, although far from conclusive, would suggest that a more rigorous investigation of the basic motivational pattern among youth is in order. In a technologically-advanced society ideology is an extremely difficult concept to pin down, because

the diversity of lifestyles and subcultures allows for a diffusion of values, and depending upon the specifity or generality of the values that are being considered, it is possible to arrive at very different conceptualizations or central themes. However, one central aspect of ideology in a capitalist economy or any economy that is committed to industrial growth as a fundamental goal, is the importance of values related to production. We have referred to this as achievement, partly because it grows out of tradition in the social sciences that seems to capture the spirit of this ethic, and partly because the idea of "striving for excellence" and the related values of individualism, activism, and future-orientation seems essential to a society that is committed to economic growth. The evidence that we have presented to suggest that this ideology is weakening is drawn from the fact that new entrants to the Labour Force are deliberately withholding a commitment to conventional jobs, and in some cases attempting to redefine the work orientation; and that in support institutions like the school, capable students are not responding to the usual incentives and either are "dropping out" or performing poorly. The school system seems to be fragmenting in response to these pressures. These behaviours would indicate that there is a serious questioning of the fundamental value of economic growth as an end in itself, and that youth are attempting to establish social relationships that are directed towards other goals. Furthermore, it is being suggested that this attempted reorientation represents a weakening of the ideology of achievement (the label that we have chosen to describe the outlook necessary to sustain economic growth).

Now it could be argued with some validity that it is not the desire to achieve that has weakened, but rather the goals of the achievement. Within the humanistic ideologies that many youth have adopted the notion of striving for excellence still prevails. In the Maslowian framework, for example, the goal is to strive for "self-actualization" as opposed to operating from "lower" needs. There is little doubt that the idea of achievement that has been central to the culture of societies devoted to economic productivity still is very prevalent, and that it will continue to prevail as long as the basic institutions in society remain relatively stable, but the important point is that there is a serious questioning as well as a gradual change, and that the humanistic mutations of this basic ideological framework are less compatible with the institutional pattern needed to sustain a capitalist society than their nonhumanistic counterparts. A youth who adopts the importance of "self-actualization" is not likely to adjust to the assembly-line at General Motors, or any regimented corporate institution whether it is a workplace or a school. His strivings require creative outlets; and he is likely to rebel or withhold a commitment to any institution that is incompatible with his outlook.

The exact meaning of the great refusal is an important question that requires further empirical investigation. If further evidence accumulates to suggest that the ideological changes among youth represent an outlook that is incompatible with economic goals of capitalism, then the functional explanation that this phenomena represents a transition phase from childhood to adulthood, has to be dismissed as incorrect (Parsons, 1942; Eisenstadt, 1956; 1965; 1966). A reaction to society hardly could be viewed as an

adjustment mechanism, if it leads to maladjustment to conventional institutions. Moreover, the explanation proposed by Parsons (1965), that this extreme reaction by youth is a by-product of rapid technological change, assuming that it has some validity, doesn't really come to grips with the implications that the great refusal has for society.

There seems little doubt that the youth cultures in industrially advanced societies are making it increasingly difficult for youth to adjust to conventional roles. However, the more important question is whether this phenomena will remain what has been called a "2% culture" that can have no serious impact on society, or whether the human and social forces that are stimulating youth to withhold a commitment to conventional social roles will continue to grow, and we are witnessing the initial signal of a more profound social movement -- the seeds of revolution? This latter question requires some analysis of the forces stimulating the great refusal.

b) Forces Stimulating the Contraculture

There are two striking features of the noncommital pattern among youth that immediately come to light. The first -- which is most self-evident -- is the youthfulness of the proponents. The second, is the fact that the strongest opposition seems to be coming from the "successes" rather than "failures". The most militant opponents of society are concentrated in the universities, and even among the university students there appears to be some relationship between conventionality and social class. Noncommitment is being seeded by wealth, rather than poverty; and this anomoly is difficult to explain using a Marxist class analysis.

If in fact the combination of youthfulness and success is stimulating an oppositional culture, it seems important to examine each of these factors in a developmental context. The first part is easier to speculate about, since the literature is replete with many rich explanations of the biological, emotional, and intellectual factors that makes youth a difficult period of adjustment (Erikson, 1968; Keniston, 1968; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Youth is a period of reconciliation between the individual and society, when the individual forms a sense of self that allows for a harmonious relationship with others. This reconciliation is most difficult in industrialized societies where the disjunction between childhood and adulthood is more extreme, and the period of transition is lengthier. As the process of industrialization has continued, two factors have made the transition period lengthier. First, the onset of the adolescent growth spurt has come at an earlier age, beginning at about age 13 in most industrialized countries (Tanner, 1962). This represents a decline in the onset of adolescence of more than four years during the last 130 years. Secondly, the years of training needed to participate in the labour force has increased as the economy has assumed greater technological complexity. In the initial stages of industrialization where the economy was primarily agricultural, and labour was performed through the family unit, youth could join the labour force as soon as they had the necessary strength and manual dexterity. Because childhood and adulthood merged there wasn't an extended period of

identity formation during which the biologically-mature adolescent was trained for adult social roles. As industrialization has proceeded, the period of training has increased. Before assuming adult roles youth are segregated into institutions of learning to develop intellectual, technical, and social skills needed to adjust to the industrial world. For example, in Canada during 1971, only 50.7% of youth aged 14-24 participated in the labour force, and if the projections for the expansion of education prove to be accurate, the participation rate among youth will continue to decline (Illing & Zsigmond, 1967). A student studying for a profession can be expected to attend school until his or her middle or late twenties, and a grade twelve level diploma is becoming a minimum standard for even the most menial of jobs.*

Given the present circumstances, there seems to be no apparent reason why the trends toward a lengthier period of youth should change. The social forces that are contributing to the earlier onset of the adolescent growth spurt and the lengthier apprenticeship for the economy are continuing to operate. Based on these trends, it would have to be predicted that the period of time that biologically-mature youth spend in a nonadult state, under the influence of dissonant peer cultures, will increase significantly, and the tension that is associated with this period of adjustment will be exacerbated in the future.

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* For a trenchant commentary upon this situation in the United States, see: Ivar Berg, Education and jobs: The great training robbery.

Although the case can be made that a prolonged apprenticeship may be stimulating identity-conflict and tension, and that the degree of conflict might in some way be related to the length of the apprenticeship, this does not explain why the revolt among youth has taken its present form. If a desire to withhold commitment to conventional institutions is the inevitable outgrowth of an extended apprenticeship, why then are those experiencing this reaction a minority among youth, let alone a mini-minority of the total population? Youth of the 1950's also underwent an extended apprenticeship, and in spite of their rebellious pranks and fads, were quite conventional in orientation. Rather than prolonging the nonadult state, they desired to shorten this period of life and become adults as rapidly as possible. At present we find the opposite reaction. Youth are undecided about careers when options are available, dropping out of school when the degree is accessible, doing poorly in their academic work when they have the talent, and experimenting with counter-institutions when the conventional institutions have the welcome mat cut and dusted off. A prolonged apprenticeship may explain identity conflict, but it does not explain the development of an oppositional identity or a deliberate withholding of commitment.

If, in fact there is a shift in basic motivational orientation, it can be contended that this shift is occurring predominantly among youth rather than adults because this strata of society are in the process of being socialized, and conflicting social forces are most likely to be acted out within this group. To use a metaphor, the period from puberty prior to assuming adult roles could be viewed as a stage upon which a drama is unfolding.

But why is the plot one of deliberately withholding a commitment or in some cases overt opposition to conventions, instead of a cry for more production, more achievement, and more of the same? And why are those who have volunteered to participate in this drama drawn from the most "successful" strata in society? Perhaps these two questions are tied together, and related to the content of the achievement ideology and to the nature of success. As mentioned previously, achievement could be viewed as a motor that stimulated industrial development. When the material conditions were ready the idea of proving one's worth, relative to others by striving for excellence, made the machines of industry turn. For a complex of psychological and social reasons, that were both rational and quite irrational, this calling had meaning to people and became a driving social force.* People accepted the fact that the purpose of their work should be to expand production and that academic training prior to entering the Labour Force should be to develop characteristics that the Great Industrial Machine requires. The social sciences, for their part, either dismissed human nature, with the exception of its adaptive qualities, or made allowance for competing biological drives that were activated primarily by deficiency. Thus the "good society" was one that could produce more than the "underdeveloped" and overcome human deficits. Humans were socialized to produce, because it was believed that maximizing production was a worthwhile human goal. The ideology of achievement served the purpose of stimulating production, and more important, obscuring other real human deficiencies that this socialization pattern was creating.

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* See E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom for an interesting discussion of why the ideas of the Protestant Reformation were assimilated.

Not all segments of society were allured by the ideology of achievement. Indeed, it seems that the "culturally deprived" had the misfortune of having values less compatible with efficient production to guide their development. The socialization pattern of striving for standards of excellence was most strongly adopted by the middle class, and contributed to the "success" of this group relative to others (Rosen, 1956; 1959; McClelland, 1967). And, at present it seems that this ideology is being rejected most strongly by middle class youth, for reasons that are not easily discernible, unless one assumes that there is more to human nature than competing biological drives -- and an inalienable part of human nature is the capacity to rebel against frustrating social relations. The functional social relations most conducive to efficient production seem to be inducing rebellion among those who are best equipped to adapt to them, and readily could have access to the valued goals of society -- including material affluence, academic education, healthcare. On the other hand, acceptance of the ideology of achievement is most manifest among those who still strive for success -- that is the goods and services readily available in the middle class. To put it simply, functional social relations can become chronically dysfunctional when the goal of the organization is perceived as being of minimal value. And it seems that among segments of the middle class production for the sake of production is treated with an abundance of skepticism, if not outright rejection.

In a society of material scarcity, one can readily believe that the notion of self-denial to achieve excellence had meaning, especially when the rewards allowed for the purchase of goods and services that met real

human needs. The ideology provided a rational purpose even if there were irrational and humanly harmful consequences. However, for those who have been liberated from material want, and for those who believe that the productive capacity exists to eliminate material want for all, the consequences of the ideology of achievement can no longer be obscured by any rational purpose that may have been served in the past. As a result, we presently have the anomoly that an ideology that stimulated the material conditions for affluence is making itself obsolete -- and is likely to continue to sew the seeds of its destruction the longer it remains intact.

As industrialization continues and material goods and services become more broadly distributed, skepticism directed at the goals of achievement and the adoption of humanistic ideals is likely to spread. Moreover, the fundamental commitment of capitalist economic organization to expanding production means that there are limitations to which institutions can offer viable alternatives. The corporation, for example, can placate worker dissatisfaction by modifying the highly specialized assembly line into somewhat more complex components, and can have workers participate in reorganizing the tasks, but it cannot abandon its fundamental commitment to maintaining production at a profitable level. In a capitalist society creative expression must always be secondary to the profitableness of labour. Similarly, the school can liberalize regulations, and move toward a "free school" model; however, the fact that schools are provided with capital to socialize and select students for the economy places a major constraint on the reorganization of education. As long as the goals of the economy remain unchanged, humanistic orientations that teachers might preach are secondary to the practice of

socializing students to excel and selecting the successes and failures. The teacher-student relationship is defined by the functions of the institution -- and as long as the functions remain unchanged, variations in the teacher-student relationship are limited (Quarter, 1972). Even in "free schools" innovative practice is limited by the awareness that scholastic performance is the major vehicle to valued professional jobs (Durrie, 1972). Like the corporation, schools can make normative changes by placing students on governing bodies, or modifying specific regulations in response to pressure from students, but the nature of the society of which the school is a part supports the basic institutional structure.

Schools can allow the teaching of humanistic ideas but it is more difficult to practice them. And the corporation can endorse all the symbols of youth, but it's fundamental commitment to profit means that freedom, ecology, and long hair are peddled like any other product. Basically, the conflict between the humanistic ideologies spreading among youth, and the institutional commitment to economic production is irreconcilable. The institutions can only feign concern and make minor reforms to siphon off the pressure.

For those who have divorced themselves from the ideology of achievement, the only options are to withhold a commitment, to join oppositional subcultures, or to move to rural countercultures. As long as the basic institutions of society remain relatively stable, then viable options become limited. Counter-institutions operate under great hardship and tend to be very transient.

In summary, this analysis leads to the conclusion that the youth revolt is a significant social force that will continue to grow. The process of industrialization should be extending the period of youth as well as creating greater productivity; and productivity seems to be undermining the motivating force of the achievement ideology. These circumstances are creating an increasing number of noncommitted people who are desirous of a reorientation to life -- a condition that eventually must affect the very nature of society.

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